2015 Tax-Competitiveness Report: Canada is Losing its Attractiveness by Bazel, Philip & Mintz, Jack M.
www.policyschool.ca
Volume 9 • Issue 37 • November 2016
2015 TAX-COMPETITIVENESS REPORT: 
CANADA IS LOSING ITS ATTRACTIVENESS†
Philip Bazel and Jack Mintz*
SUMMARY
It can be easy for Canadians who appreciate the qualities of their country to 
overestimate the power that it also has to lure investment in a world where so 
many other destinations are competing for capital. Canadians can take pride 
in our political stability and our highly educated workforce, and we do have 
good communication and transportation infrastructure, but a great number of 
other countries offer those things, too, at roughly the same level. Meanwhile, 
Canada suffers in the eyes of investors for being a relatively small market, distant 
from large export destinations, with a cold climate and geographic vastness that 
only raise the cost of doing business here. Canada has been able to overcome 
its disadvantages in recent years largely by being highly competitive on 
business taxes. Unfortunately, the tendency of Canadian provincial and federal 
governments lately to raise taxes on business has been rapidly erasing that slight 
advantage. Dangerously, Canada is beginning to lose its competitive edge.
It is difficult enough in a world of slower global growth to attract investment, 
but some major economies with whom Canada directly competes for investment 
have recognized the need in this challenging environment to make themselves 
even more attractive to investors. It is true that some countries, such as Belgium, 
Chile, Brazil, Greece and India have, like Canada, enacted certain policies — 
primarily higher business taxes — that have increased their marginal effective 
tax rate (METR). Still, other important peer countries have been working to 
lower theirs; notably Denmark, Japan, France, Portugal, Switzerland and the U.K. 
As a result of their cuts, and because of changes to policies in Canada that have 
increased METRs here, Canada has sunk from having the 16th-highest burden on 
capital in the OECD (which was at least in the middle of the pack) to having the 
13th highest. We now have the sixth-highest rather than lowest METR in the G7. 
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In a compilation of 92 countries, Canada finds itself in the middle of the pack with the 35th 
highest tax burden on capital. 
The blame for this is shared by provincial and federal governments. In recent years, 
governments in Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, Alberta and B.C. have all 
raised business taxes (Alberta now has a higher corporate income tax than B.C. Ontario 
or Quebec). Quebec has scaled back incentives for investors, Manitoba increased its sales 
tax, and B.C. eliminated the harmonized sales tax, reintroducing the burden on business 
inputs implicit in the provincial retail sales tax.
With the U.S. election of Donald Trump and a Republican Congress promising to reduce 
corporate income tax rates, as well as the recent affirmation by British Prime Minister 
Theresa May to lower the U.K. corporate income tax rate to 17 per cent, the pressure will 
be to reduce, not increase corporate income taxes in the next several years. Should the 
U.S. dramatically reduce its corporate tax rate, Canada will lose its business tax advantage 
altogether.
Just as concerning, Canada has created a tax system that discriminates against the service 
sector, including transportation, communications, construction, trade, and business and 
financial services, all of which are among the fastest-growing sectors, and play a key 
role in facilitating innovation, infrastructure and trade. Canada’s tax policies continue to 
favour slower-growing sectors, namely manufacturing and resources. 
The good news is that Canada can regain competitiveness without drastic tax reform. It is 
clear that there needs to be greater neutrality among sectors so that service industries are 
not discriminated against (the same is true for large businesses versus small businesses). 
Meanwhile, those provinces that still have a retail sales tax can improve their attractiveness 
by moving to the HST, as other provinces have. The federal government is also in the 
midst of reviewing subsidies and other tax expenditures that create an unlevel playing 
field. However, instead of spending that money as it plans to, it should consider Canada’s 
falling competitiveness and use the revenues to lower the corporate income tax. With the 
savings, it could afford to cut that tax from 15 to 13 per cent, not only remaining revenue 
neutral, but likely actually increasing the corporate tax base in the process.
1Since the 2008 financial crisis, global annual economic growth has stalled. The global 
GDP growth of over four per cent seen during the years 2003–07 has declined to a post-
2012 average of 2.5 per cent.1 Along with other industrialized economies, Canada’s post-
2012 growth has been barely more than two per cent, which is disappointing to say the 
least and a sharp decline compared with previous years in this century. Job creation and 
business investment has not been as robust as it was in the previous decade, reflecting the 
challenging global economic environment.
Despite the past global headwinds, the improvements made to Canada’s corporate tax 
structure between 2000 and 2012 provided support for better investment performance.2 
Canada moved from having the second-highest tax burden on new investment in 2000 to 
the middle of the pack among industrialized economies by 2012. Growth in real investment 
in the private sector increased in the post-2000 decade compared to the previous decade.3 
However, this improvement in the business tax structure could not counter the difficult 
post-2008 global economy, which has translated into poorer private sector investment in 
Canada and elsewhere.
Since 2012, however, Canada has been losing its international tax attractiveness for 
business investment. Its effective corporate tax rate on new investment has risen from 17.5 
per cent in 2012 to 20.0 per cent in 2015, an increase of 14 per cent over the period due 
primarily to higher provincial corporate income tax rates; the B.C. government’s reversal of 
its sales tax reform, with its return to the former provincial retail sales tax; and reductions 
in tax preferences at federal and provincial levels. This is not consistent with global trends. 
G7, G20 and OECD countries have generally reduced their effective tax rates on investment 
since 2012, resulting in Canada moving up from 16th- to 13th-highest tax burden on capital 
among 33 OECD countries as of 2015. With the 2016 budget’s changes, the picture has not 
improved as Canada’s effective tax rate has jumped up slightly to 20.1 per cent.
This higher tax on capital investment in Canada since 2012 translates into a loss in private 
investment by 0.9 percentage points, or $6.5 billion.4 Capital investment is important for a 
nation’s labour productivity as it provides the means and technology for the workforce to 
produce more goods and services. 
Some other industrialized countries, concerned over growth, are using the business tax  
structure to improve economic performance. G7 countries like the United Kingdom  
and Italy have made significant changes to their corporate taxes to lower tax burdens on  
capital since 20145. Not only is our corporate tax regime looking less favourable, but other 
1 
The World Bank website, “GDP growth (annual %),” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.
2 
As documented in earlier global tax-competitiveness reports and discussed below, tax reforms introduced by federal and 
provincial governments have improved investment performance, after taking into account other factors that influence 
investment. Obviously, the financial crisis and more recent decline in commodity prices have hurt demand for investment in 
Canada and elsewhere. 
3 
D. Chen and J. Mintz, “The 2012 Global Tax Competitiveness Ranking: A Canadian Good News Story,” University of 
Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper 5, 28 (2012).
4 
This calculation is based on private sector investment (Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 029-0048 2012-2015) and an 
elasticity of capital investment to the cost of capital equal to 0.7.
5 
To counter the economic uncertainty created by its referendum supporting Brexit, the United Kingdom announced that it 
would reduce its corporate income tax rate to 15 per cent. Currently it is 20 per cent, and there was already a plan to lower 
the rate to 17 per cent by 2019. Prime Minister May recently reaffirmed adopting the 17 per cent rate.
2impediments to investment, including hikes to personal income, sales and excise tax and 
regulatory holdups, are hurting Canada’s image as an attractive place to do business. 
With the U.S. election of Donald Trump and a Republican Congress promising to reduce 
corporate income tax rates as well as the recent affirmation by the Prime Minister May to 
lower the U.K. corporate income tax rate to 17 percent, the pressure will be to reduce, not 
increase corporate income taxes in the next several years. This includes Canada.
Given that Canada is a relatively small market, has a cold climate and is distant from large 
populations, there are fewer economic advantages for businesses to locate here rather 
than elsewhere. Sure, Canada has a well-educated labour force, political stability and 
good communication and transportation infrastructure, but these factors, while conducive 
to investment, are not significantly better than in other major industrialized countries.6 
Public policies that help Canada narrow the competitive gap, such as an attractive tax and 
regulatory regime, help increase the incentive to invest and create jobs here.
Part of a fair, efficient, and attractive tax regime is neutrality — an even playing field and 
comparable tax burdens across business activities. Tax systems that favour one type of 
investment over another through accelerated depreciation, tax credits, exemptions and 
other preferences can undermine growth by shifting capital from high-profit to low-profit 
economic opportunities. Canada has a business tax structure that discriminates against 
the service sectors, including transportation, communications, construction, trade and 
other business services, which are fast-growing sectors. Indeed, as we show below, other 
countries, including the United States, have a more even-handed approach when dealing 
with varied major business activities. 
The federal government is wisely reviewing tax expenditures in Canada, which could result 
in it reducing distortions by achieving a more level playing field among business activities. 
While the Liberals indicated during the last election campaign that their government would 
use the revenues from any tax reforms to fund new spending, we believe this would be a 
critical error. Given that Canada is losing its reputation as an attractive location for business 
investment, we would argue that revenues from the tax-expenditure exercise should be used 
to reduce the corporate income tax rate, which would also reduce discrimination against 
the service sector. Canada has benefited from reductions in the corporate tax rate and the 
increased neutrality that was achieved through a series of reforms that began in 2000. Our 
experience suggests the following:7
• The reduction in effective tax rates on capital since 2000 has improved capital 
investment, after taking into account other economic factors that influence 
investment. Roughly, the effective tax rate on new investment has fallen by one-half, 
resulting in $80 billion in additional private investment (an increase of 19 per cent). 
• Base-broadening since 2000 has shrunk the difference between statutory and 
effective corporate income taxes paid as a share of profits, thereby leading to a more 
neutral corporate income tax system.
6 
In the case of public and private infrastructure, Canada is slipping too. See McKinsey Global Institute, “Bridging Global 
Infrastructure Gaps” (2016). 
7 
See D. Chen and J. Mintz, “The 2014 Tax Competitiveness Report: A Proposed Business Tax Reform Agenda,” University 
of Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper 8, 4 (February 2015).
3• The reduction in statutory corporate income tax rates has resulted in little change to 
corporate income tax revenue as a share of GDP, which was roughly three per cent of 
GDP, on average, from 2001 to 2015 (in contrast to 2.4 per cent of GDP, which was its 
average between 1991 and 2000). Base-broadening and internationally competitive tax 
rates have given companies a strong incentive to keep profits in Canada. 
It is appealing in policy terms to continue a path of reducing corporate income tax rates 
without significantly hurting revenues available to the government to fund public services. 
Internationally competitive tax rates and neutrality are wise policy objectives for both 
federal and provincial governments to pursue.
WHAT IS NEW IN THIS REPORT?
Tax competitiveness for capital investment is based on an analytical measure of the 
marginal effective tax rate (METR). The METR is the annualized value of corporate 
taxes paid as a percentage of the pre-tax profitability of marginal investments. Marginal 
investments are those that are incremental to the economy: they earn sufficient profit to 
be taxable, to attract financing from investors and to cover risk. At the margin, businesses 
invest in capital until the rate of return on capital, net of taxes and risk, is equal to the cost 
of financing capital (their interest rate). If the rate of return is more (less) than financing 
costs, firms will invest more (less) in capital. Thus, if a government increases the tax rate, it 
will result in businesses rejecting marginal projects that would otherwise be profitable if the 
tax burden were smaller. 
Taxes that impinge on capital investment include corporate income taxes (both the tax 
rate and tax base), sales taxes on capital purchases (such as retail sales taxes), asset-based 
taxes (capital taxes and property taxes), and transfer taxes on real estate and financial 
transactions. In our analysis, we have included most taxes; however, we have not integrated 
municipal property taxes, as they are difficult to measure due to variation in municipal rates 
and bases and cannot be compiled by industry sector (even for Canada alone). 
In our analysis, we use similar capital structures to isolate tax differences among 92 
countries. The capital structures, reflecting the distribution of assets among machinery, 
buildings, inventory and land investments, are based on Canadian data. We include all 
industries except oil and gas, mining and finance.8 Economic depreciation rates for assets 
are also based on Statistics Canada estimates. Bond interest rates reflect differences in 
inflation rates across countries (following the purchasing-power-parity assumption that 
implies interest rates rise one point with each one-point increase in inflation). Equity costs 
are based on a marginal supplier of finance equating the after-tax rates of return on stocks 
and bonds (the marginal investor is assumed to be a G7 investor holding an international 
portfolio of bonds and equities). 
8 
Much work is needed to analyze taxes in these sectors, so international comparisons have been more limited. For some 
international comparisons, see J. Mintz, and D. Chen, “Capturing Economic Rents from Resources through Royalties and 
Taxes,” University of Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper 5, 30 (2012); and D. Crisan and J. Mintz, “Alberta’s 
New Royalty Regime is a Step Towards Competitiveness: A 2016 Update,” University of Calgary School of Public 
Policy Research Paper 9, 35 (October 2016). Mintz and Nikolakakis found that the financial sector is most heavily taxed 
on investments by provincial capital taxes and non-refundable sales taxes on capital purchases: Jack Mintz and Angelo 
Nikolakakis, “Tax Policy Options for Promoting Economic Growth and Job Creation by Leveraging a Strong Financial 
Services Sector” (Toronto: Financial Services Alliance, December 2015).
4In this 2015 analysis, we have undertaken several model changes to improve the analysis, 
thus making our results not strictly comparable to earlier reports. We have updated: tax 
parameters; G7 personal tax rates on interest, dividends and capital gains; interest rates; and 
inflation rates. We have also made adjustments to general asset-based taxes such as Japan’s 
tax on fixed assets for each year. The appendix provides a review of the theory and new 
parameters used in the model.
The largest change is the inclusion of transfer taxes, which are particularly important 
in some countries like Australia,9 China, India, Luxembourg, Morocco, Portugal and 
Thailand. Transfer taxes affect not only investment decisions but also affect the holding 
period for assets by discouraging firms from substituting new assets for old. These taxes 
were included only for 2015 and not backdated to 2005.
HOW DID METRS CHANGE IN 2015?
Despite many governments challenged by continuing fiscal deficits and high debt, there 
has been a slight downtick in the tax burden on capital in 2015, at least on average among 
industrialized countries. Some countries have reduced business taxes on investment, 
including Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. Some others have increased the METR, such as Brazil, Belgium, Canada and 
Hungary. Many countries have barely changed their business tax regimes; this would 
include, notably, the United States which has the third-highest tax on capital among the 92 
countries measured. Overall, while OECD nations have reduced the tax burden on capital 
slightly, the average METR increased in other parts of the world.
As shown in Figure 1 and Table 1, the tax burden on new investment in Canada has 
risen 14 per cent from 17.5 per cent in 2012 to 20 per cent in 2015 (the METR for 2016 is 
20.1 per cent as shown later in this report). This can largely be attributed to increases in 
the corporate income tax rate by governments in New Brunswick, Alberta, and British 
Columbia, as well as B.C.’s abandonment of the creditable HST and return to the provincial 
retail sales tax in 2013.
As a result, Canada is ranked less favourably, since most countries have continued to 
reduce taxes on capital investment since 2012. 
Canada now has the sixth-highest METR in the G7, with Italy having the lowest. On 
average, G7 countries have reduced their METR since 2012 (the simple average falling 
from 30.3 to 26.8 per cent, while the weighted average has fallen from 33.8 to 31.8 per cent). 
Both among G20- and OECD-country groupings, Canada has the 13th-highest METR in 
2015, compared to its ranking of 16th highest in 2012. 
9 
See Jack Mintz, Philip Bazel and Duanjie Chen, “Growing the Australian economy with a competitive company tax” 
(Minerals Council of Australia, March 2016). 
5FIGURE 1 MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES BY YEAR FOR CANADA AND COUNTRY GROUPINGS:  
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TABLE 1 SIMPLE AND WEIGHTED METRS
METR 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Canada 38.8 36.2 30.9 28.0 27.3 19.9 18.8 17.5 18.8 19.0 20.0
G7* 35.8 35.3 34.6 31.9 31.8 30.6 30.3 30.3 29.1 27.7 26.8
G7 w 36.3 36.1 35.9 34.4 34.4 33.9 33.8 33.8 33.1 32.5 31.8
G20* 32.2 31.3 31.1 30.0 28.3 27.8 27.7 27.8 27.3 26.6 26.5
G20 w 36.6 36.3 36.2 35.0 32.6 32.2 32.1 32.2 31.6 31.1 30.8
OECD* 21.4 20.7 20.2 19.1 18.9 18.7 18.7 18.6 18.5 18.1 17.7
OECD  w 32.7 32.3 31.9 30.7 30.6 30.3 30.2 30.2 29.6 29.1 28.5
* = Simple average, w= GDP-weighted average.
TABLE 2 CANADA’S RANK AMONG COUNTRY GROUPS FROM HIGHEST TO LOWEST METR 
Canada’s Rank 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
G7 2 2 6 5 5 7 7 7 7 6 6
G20 5 5 11 10 9 15 16 16 16 15 13
OECD 2 2 6 5 5 13 14 16 14 13 13
Notes: Rank is descending; a higher ranking equates to a higher METR.
Among the 92 countries in this study, Canada has the 35th-highest tax burden on capital 
in 2015. This is a significant improvement from 2005 when it was eighth highest of 92 
countries (India, Japan, China and Kuwait had the highest METRs). As shown in the 
appendix with year-by-year METRs for the 92 countries, the average METR among our 
group of 92 countries rose from 18.0 to 18.6 per cent (simple average) from 2014 to 2015. 
The 2015 METR for our select group of 92 countries, however, is 3.3 percentage points less 
than it was in 2005. 
6FIGURE 2 METRS BY COUNTRY: 2015 AND 2005
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ARE COUNTRIES LIKE CANADA LESS INTERESTED IN REDUCING  
BUSINESS TAX BURDENS?
In the last decade, countries have generally reduced statutory corporate income tax rates in 
the interest of encouraging capital investment and encouraging companies to keep taxable 
profits in their jurisdiction. With initiatives to expand the tax base, corporate tax revenues 
need not fall even though statutory corporate tax rates fell. As seen in Figure 3 (and Table 
A.1 in the appendix), corporate income tax rates fell in the decade in almost all countries. 
The general corporate income tax rate fell from 28.6 per cent in 2005 to 25 per cent in 2015 
among 92 countries (the OECD average fell from 28.2 to 25.3 per cent in the same period). 
8FIGURE 3 EFFECTIVE CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES FOR OECD COUNTRIES IN 2005 AND 2015
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Although statutory tax rates have fallen, corporate taxes have risen as a share of GDP 
among OECD countries, from 2.7 per cent of GDP (1990–2000) to 3.1 per cent (2001–2014). 
For Canada, corporate income taxes as share of GDP also rose from 2.9 to 3.2 per cent in 
this period. Despite having a high corporate income tax rate, the United States collects a 
low amount of corporate income tax revenue as a share of GDP, in part due to various tax 
incentives and in part due to companies proving less willing to keep their profits in the 
United States.
9FIGURE 4 CORPORATE INCOME TAXES AS A SHARE OF GDP FOR CANADA, THE U.S., THE U.K., AND OECD 
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In 2015, statutory corporate income tax rates among OECD countries slightly decreased 
from 25.5 to 25.3 per cent (see Table A.1 in the appendix). G7 and G20 average corporate 
rates also declined (whether measured as simple or GDP-weighted averages). Among the 
92 countries, corporate income tax rates have remained stable at 25.0 per cent (using the 
simple average). Are the rate-cutting days now over?
Certainly governments have become more concerned about tax competition that could hurt 
revenues, resulting in greater reliance on taxes paid by their own residents. The desire to 
increase taxes grew as a reaction to reports that companies are not paying sufficient tax in 
some jurisdictions.10 The G20 countries in 2013 were provided an action plan to combat 
base erosion and profit shifting following a request to the OECD.11 Recommendations, 
including country-by-country reporting, have been adopted. Further actions will be taken 
in the future. 
Nonetheless, some countries, including Canada, are increasing tax burdens on capital. 
Those G20 and OECD countries that have significantly increased taxes on capital include:
• Belgium: Its METR rose 3.1 percentage points from 15.3 to 18.4 per cent, largely as 
a result of a reduction in its allowance for equity financing well below a firm’s cost of 
equity financing.
• Brazil: Its METR rose 3.8 percentage points to 45.5 per cent, largely due to higher 
inflation as well as some increases in contribution taxes that increased financial costs.
10 
See J. Mintz and V. B. Venkatachalam, “The Problem with the Low-Tax Backlash: Rethinking Corporate Tax Policies to 
Adjust for Uneven Reputational Risks,” University of Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper 8, 24 (2015). This list 
has included Starbucks, Bank of America, General Electric, Pfizer, Eli Lilly, Oracle, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Verizon, 
and Federal Express (for example: Tom Bergin, “Starbucks to move European base to London, pay more UK tax,” Reuters, 
April 16, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-starbucks-unitedkingdom-idUKBREA3F03820140416). The recent media 
uproar over the so-called “Panama papers” has also raised public ire over tax evasion and avoidance.
11 
See OECD website, “Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes,” https://www.oecd.
org/g20/topics/taxation/.
10
• Chile: Corporate income tax rates were raised by 1.5 percentage points to 22.5 per 
cent. In Canada, corporate income tax rates rose 0.3 points to 26.6 per cent; in 
Greece they rose three points to 29 per cent; and in India, corporate income tax rates 
increased 0.6 points to 34.6 per cent.
Yet, despite the concerns raised about tax competition and base erosion, a majority of 
governments have avoided increasing or have even reduced corporate income tax rates and 
taxes on business capital due to concerns about investment and job creation:
• Denmark reduced its corporate income tax rate in 2015 by one point to 23.5 per 
cent, with a further reduction planned in 2016 to 22 per cent. It is also broadening the 
tax base by tightening provisions related to avoiding withholding taxes paid by non-
residents.
• Countries with relatively higher tax burdens on capital have been reducing their 
corporate income tax rates, including Japan, which reduced it by almost four points 
to 33.1 per cent in 2015. Japan’s METR is highest in the G7 at 42.1 per cent due to 
its fixed-assets tax of 1.7 per cent on real property and 1.4 per cent on depreciable 
property. 
• Portugal lowered its corporate income tax rate by two points to 29.5 per cent. 
• France increased corporate taxes with the introduction of a surtax in 2013 resulting 
in an overall corporate income tax rate of 38 per cent, fourth highest in the world. The 
surtax is to be dropped after 2016, resulting in a 3.53-percentage-point reduction in 
the corporate income tax.
• The United Kingdom continues to reduce corporate income tax rates substantially 
— at 20 per cent in 2015 (compared to 30 per cent in 2007) — while tightening up 
provisions related to the taxation of international income. It had planned to further 
reduce the corporate income tax rate to 17 per cent by 2019. 
• Switzerland reduced its corporate income tax rate from 21.1 to 17.9 per cent in 2015. 
Obviously, governments are conflicted over corporate taxation. They wish to protect their 
tax base to fund public services, but also wish to encourage private investment, which 
is important to growth. Polices that tighten up the tax treatment of international income 
provide an opportunity to reduce corporate income tax rates, enabling a country to 
accomplish both objectives.
MYTHS ABOUT CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION12
Corporate taxation is a complex subject and not easily understood by the broad public. 
Political debate often tends to become simplified, resulting in several myths about what a 
company tax can achieve. 
Myth 1: Corporate taxes are paid by the rich.
While the legal incidence of the corporate tax falls on the corporation, its economic 
12 
This section is partly derived from Mintz, Bazel and Chen, “Growing the Australian Economy.”
11
incidence is a much different matter. It is average people who ultimately pay corporate 
taxes through higher consumer prices, lower wages or returns paid to owners. While the 
public may believe that taxing corporations improves fairness by making the rich pay more, 
recent economic analysis confirms that this is not likely the case.13 
In a small open economy, corporate taxes cannot be easily shifted back to domestic or non-
resident owners by reducing returns, since investors shift funds to other opportunities in 
international markets where returns are higher. The corporate tax is recovered by raising 
prices on consumers or by reducing wage payments to labour, including layoffs, or rents 
paid to landowners. 
The world is much more complicated than suggested by the assumption of a “small open 
economy,” resulting in some corporate tax being shifted onto the owner. Studies have 
shown that investors have a “home bias” to invest in domestic securities, resulting from 
institutional or informational barriers to trade. Smaller corporations have little or no access 
to international markets so that home bias is most important in these cases. Further, when 
corporate taxes are increased, they can impact on the old capital values leading to windfall 
losses to owners (and vice versa for corporate tax reductions). However, the windfall loss 
(gain) will be blunted by profits being shifted to (from) other jurisdictions in response. 
Estimates of the incidence of company taxes in recent studies suggest the following: 
• Arnold Harberger shows that labour bears almost 96 per cent of the burden of 
corporate tax.14 In a similar vein, Randolph shows that labour bears 70 per cent of the 
corporate tax with fixed world capital stock.15
• Arulampalam et al. estimate that each one-dollar increase in a firm’s tax liability 
leads to a 64-cent reduction in total compensation in the short run, and a 49-cent 
reduction in the long run.16
• Hassett and Mathur find that corporate tax rates affect wage levels across countries 
with a one-per-cent increase in corporate tax rates leading to nearly a 0.5-per-cent fall 
in wage rates.”17
• Liu and Altshuler estimate that a one-dollar increase in corporate tax revenue 
decreases wages by approximately $0.60.18
• Ebrahami and Vaillancourt estimate that a one-point increase in the corporate income 
tax rate reduces the wage rate by 0.15 to 0.24 per cent.19 A larger impact was found 
13 
See also B. Dahlby and K. Hassett, “Economic Effects of the Corporate Tax: A Review of the Recent Literature,” 
manuscript (2016).
14 
A. C. Harberger, “Corporate Tax Incidence: Reflections on what is Known, Unknown, and Unknowable,” in Fundamental 
Tax Reform: Issues, Choices and Implications, ed. John W. Diamond and George R. Zodrow (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2006).
15 
W. G. Randolph, “International Burdens of the Corporate Income Tax,” Congressional Budget Office Working Paper No. 09, 
(Washington, D.C.: 2006).
16 
W. Arulampalam, M. Devereux and G. Maffini, “The Direct Incidence of Corporate Income Tax on Wages,” European 
Economic Review 56, 6 (2012): 1038-1054.
17 
K. Hassett, and A. Mathur, “A Spatial Model of Corporate Tax Incidence,” Applied Economics 47, 13 (2006): 1350-1365.
18 
L. Liu and R. Altshuler, “Measuring The Burden Of The Corporate Income Tax Under Imperfect Competition,” National 
Tax Journal 66, 1 (2013): 215-37.
19 
P. Ebrahami and F. Vaillancourt, “The Effect of Corporate Income and Payroll Taxes on the Wages of Canadian Workers” 
(Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser Institute, 2016).
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by Ferede and McKenzie, who estimate that an increase in the corporate tax by one 
dollar causes wages to fall in Canada by more than one dollar.20
• An Australian Treasury paper estimates that two-thirds of the corporate tax falls on 
workers in the long run.21
Thus, a substantial share of the corporate income tax is shifted onto labour through higher 
consumer prices (thereby reducing the purchasing power of money), wage cuts or layoffs. 
When this occurs, the effect of the corporate income tax is regressive. To the extent that the 
corporate tax reduces the return on capital, affected owners consist not just of high-income 
earners but also workers who own equity through pension plans and other intermediaries. 
Further, in the case of small companies, a significant share of the corporate tax falls 
on the owner who derives compensation both as a return on capital and as reward for 
entrepreneurial effort. 
Myth 2: Company investment decisions are not affected by corporate taxes.
At times, some might gain the impression that corporate taxes do not affect investment 
decisions, even though most companies today decide on investment plans according to their 
after-tax profitability. An erroneous and poorly done methodology is to conclude that tax 
reductions are unrelated or negatively related to investment since investment was higher in 
the 1950s when company rates were close to 60 per cent and not as strong when corporate 
taxes were reduced in later years.22 There are two flaws to this analysis:
1. It is incorrect to simply look at the relationship between investment and corporate taxes 
since other factors influence investment. It is well known that, once incorporating other 
factors in econometric analysis, the expected negative relationship between investment 
and effective tax rates will prevail, as found in most investment studies. 
2. Statutory corporate income tax rates are not the correct measure of taxes influencing 
investment. Instead the marginal effective tax rate, as measured in this study and 
elsewhere, is appropriate to use since it accounts for tax-base adjustments (such as 
depreciation, inventory and financing costs), tax credits and sales taxes on capital 
purchases and other taxes affecting capital investment. When corporate income tax 
rates were high in early years prior to 1985, tax preferences led to a much smaller base 
with many companies paying little or no income taxes. Corporate tax reform in 1985 
(phase one) and 1987 (phase two) scaled back incentives but raised the overall marginal 
effective tax rate.23 The METR rose further with the introduction of somewhat higher 
capital and sales taxes in the 1990s.  
 
 
20 
E. Ferede and K. McKenzie, “Who Pays the Corporate Tax,” presented at The School of Public Policy conference on 
corporate tax reform, University of Calgary, June 2016.
21 
R. Xavier, J. Smith and S. Wende,”The Incidence of the Company Tax in Australia,” Economic Roundup 1 (Canberra, 
Australia: Treasury, 2014).
22 
See, for example, J. Brennan, “Do Corporate Rate Reductions Accelerate Growth?” (Toronto: Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, November 2015).
23 
It was well known that the METR rose after the corporate tax reforms of 1985–87, even though statutory tax rates 
were reduced. See V. Jog and J. Mintz, “Corporate Tax Reform and its Economic Impact: An Evaluation of the Phase 1 
Proposals,” in The Economic Impact of Tax Reform ed. J. Mintz and J. Whalley (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1989).
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Unfortunately, a long series of METRs based on consistent methodology are not 
available. As shown in Figure 5, the METR was stable from 1997–2000. After 2000 
and until 2012, the METR fell more quickly with reductions in corporate tax rates and 
capital taxes and harmonization of sales taxes, compared to the decline in the corporate 
income tax rate. Since 2012, corporate income tax rates have risen slightly while the 
METR has risen more quickly with base-broadening initiatives.
FIGURE 5 METR AND CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES: CANADA 1997–2016 
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With reduced investment, economies grow less quickly, since machines, structures and 
intangible assets (such as research and exploration) are needed to produce goods and 
services in later years.24 Some taxes particularly harm economic growth by distorting work, 
investment and risk-taking decisions, resulting in the economy’s resources not being put 
to their most profitable use. This economic cost is the “deadweight loss” of taxation25 — 
the loss of consumption or production caused by tax distortions. Adding this deadweight 
loss to the cost of raising a dollar of taxes is known as the marginal cost of taxation. For 
the federal government, the marginal cost of taxation for corporate taxes is $1.45 and for 
personal taxes it is $1.17. The provincial marginal cost of taxation is higher since increases 
in provincial taxes create a larger loss in the provincial tax base: $3.62 and $81.61 for 
corporate taxation in Quebec and Alberta respectively.26 
24 
Our international comparisons do not include the resource sector, which invests in exploration and development. We do 
not include tax and grant support for research and development. For an earlier comparison of both grant and tax support 
for research and development in the United States and Canada, see Jack Mintz, Most Favored Nation (Toronto: C. D. Howe 
Institute, 2001).
25 
For a derivation and discussion of the marginal cost of taxation (or public funds) see B. Dahlby, Marginal Cost of Public 
Funds: Theory and Applications (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008).
26 
B. Dahlby, “Reforming the Tax Mix in Canada,” University of Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper 5, 14 (2012).
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Myth 3: Corporate tax reductions unduly lead to large revenue losses.
When corporate tax rates are cut, governments are rightly concerned about the loss in 
revenues needed to fund public services. Assuming that the tax base does not change (the 
“mechanical” effect), the loss in revenue can be substantial for each point reduction in the 
company tax rate. 
However, as is well known, the tax base would not remain the same — it grows (the 
“behavioural” effect). A reduction in corporate taxes leads to more investment and profits, 
thereby leading to a larger tax base. However, it takes time for capital to grow, since 
investment plans are not just waiting on a shelf, nor are new projects instantly “shovel 
ready.” Nonetheless, the tax base could grow fairly quickly when companies are able to 
shift profits from one jurisdiction to another by rearranging financial structures. If Canada 
dropped its corporate tax rate, it would create an incentive for businesses to shift costs, such 
as interest and general administrative expenses, to other jurisdictions and keep profits in 
Canada.
A good example of how this can happen is Ireland, which has adopted a low corporate 
income tax rate, much to its economic advantage, since the late 1980s. With its tax rate of 
12.5 per cent, multinationals have used transfer pricing and financing structures to shift 
profits to Ireland. Not only did book profits in Ireland rise dramatically, but investment 
growth was stellar in the 1990s. At least one study has attributed a significant share of 
Ireland’s GDP growth to such profit-shifting strategies.27 Although Ireland’s economy was 
hit hard by the 2008 financial crisis, Ireland is back to being one of the fastest-growing 
European economies today, in part due to its corporate tax policies.28 
The Irish experience is just one of many. Several studies demonstrate that the corporate 
tax base is sensitive to changes in tax rates, although estimates vary of the precise impact. 
Bartelsman and Beetsma conclude that when tax rates rise, two-thirds of the projected 
increase is lost due to profit shifting.29 Huizinga and Laeven find that each one-percentage-
point hike in the company income tax rate shrinks the tax base of European multinationals 
by 1.3 per cent.30 Jog and Tang find quite large reductions in debt financing by Canadian 
multinationals when tax rates decline.31 Mintz and Smart estimate that a one-percentage-
point drop in the provincial tax rate expands the company tax base by 4.9 per cent for large 
corporations that do not allocate income across provinces, and 2.3 per cent for those that 
do.32 Dahlby and Ferede estimate that a one-point increase in the federal-provincial tax rate 
results in a 2.3-per-cent contraction in the corporate tax base in the short run.33 Australia’s 
27 
Brendan Walsh, “The Role of Tax Policy in Ireland’s Economic Renaissance,” Canadian Tax Journal 48, 3 (2000): 658-73. 
28 
Paul Hannon, “In Ireland Economic Growth Soars Again,” The Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/
articles/in-ireland-economic-growth-soars-again-1457719427.
29 
E. Bartlesman and R. Beetsma, “Why Pay More? Corporate Tax Avoidance through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries,” 
Journal of Public Economics 87, 9-10 (2003): 2225-2252.
30 
H. Huizinga and L. Laeven, “International Profit- Shifting Within Multinationals: A Multi-Country Perspective,” Journal of 
Public Economics 92 (2008): 1164-1182.
31 
V. Jog, and J. Tang, “Tax reforms, Debt Shifting and Tax Revenues: Multinational Corporations in Canada,” International 
Tax and Public Finance 8 (2001): 5–26. 
32 
J. Mintz and M. Smart, “Income Shifting, Investment, and Tax Competition: Theory and Evidence from Provincial Taxation 
in Canada,” Journal of Public Economics 88 (2004) 1149- 1168.
33 
B. Dahlby and E. Ferede, “What Does it Cost Society to Raise a Dollar of Tax Revenue? The Marginal Cost of Public 
Funds,” Commentary No. 324 (Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute, 2011).
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Treasury Department34 estimated that a one-percentage-point reduction in the company tax 
rate would lead to a one-per-cent increase in the tax base (half the amount for “low” profit 
shifting). 
Although governments today should curtail profit shifting to the extent it leads to “double 
non-taxation” where no country raises revenue, profit shifting will normally arise — and 
be impossible to contain — when simple strategies are chosen, such as how much debt is 
raised by a multinational in each county. Thus, even if the G20 countries are able to remove 
those tax provisions that unduly result in multinationals paying little or no tax, there will be 
significant scope to shift profits from one jurisdiction to another through normal arbitrage 
opportunities. 
Overall, the loss in corporate tax revenues is blunted by growth in the tax base due to profit 
shifting and investment growth over time. This is particularly important to countries with 
high statutory company tax rates, since the high-tax jurisdiction is likely to experience the 
most base erosion when it is on the top of the rate ladder.
Summary
We can draw three lessons from the above discussion. First, the corporate tax can be 
regressive, hurting most workers and low-income Canadians. Second, the corporate tax 
hurts growth by deterring investment decisions and the adoption of new technologies. 
Third, reductions in the corporate tax rate result in some loss in revenue, but not nearly as 
much as one would think given the willingness of companies to keep profits in Canada. 
None of this implies that a corporate tax should be abolished. The role of the corporate 
income tax is to shore up the personal income tax to ensure that investors cannot avoid 
personal taxation by sheltering income in untaxed companies. As a “source-based” levy, the 
corporate tax also serves as a withholding tax on foreign investors who in some cases, such 
as that in China and the United States, credit company taxes against tax liabilities owing 
to their home governments. Further, the corporate tax often operates as a surrogate user 
fee for public services, such as infrastructure, that help businesses earn more profits. Thus, 
balance is needed between these objectives and the economic effects of corporate taxes on 
the economy.
TRANSFER TAXES
While governments have cut corporate income tax rates in the past decade and half, they 
have resorted to raising taxes on capital in other ways. Obviously, broadening the tax base 
by reducing tax incentives is one approach. Another is to impose other types of taxes on 
businesses such as capital taxes and sales taxes on capital purchases.
In our review of countries this year, we have been struck by the increasing use of transfer 
taxes to fund public spending. These include: stamp duties (taxes on financial and non-
financial asset purchases), as in Australia, India and the United Kingdom; financial 
34 
See L. Cao et al., “Understanding the Economy-wide Efficiency and Incidence of Major Australian Taxes,” Treasury 
Working Paper, 2015-01 (Canberra, Australia: April 2015). 
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transaction taxes (on debt and equity transfers, especially in banking) now used in Belgium, 
Finland, France, Italy and certain Latin American countries; and real estate transfer taxes, 
as in China and South Korea (Canada has a land-transfer tax applied to the purchase of 
structures and land). 
For 2015, we have incorporated transfer taxes in the METR measures to account for their 
impact on the METR. Of the 92 countries in our survey, 64 countries have transfer taxes 
of some sort, typically on fixed assets (land, structures and sometimes machinery) and 
securities (shares, bonds and money-market transactions). Forty-seven countries have 
transfer taxes on fixed assets, and 34 countries have taxes on financial transfers (17 have 
transfer taxes on both). 
Many transfer taxes were introduced over a century ago as stamp duties, being an easy-to-
administer source of revenue (such as in Australia, the U.K. and Canada). While financial-
transaction taxes have been introduced in the past (with some since abolished, as Sweden 
did in 1990), financial-transaction taxes have recently been introduced in various countries, 
including France and Italy, as a source of revenue to offset the cost of bank bailouts arising 
from the financial crisis, or as a way to deter speculation. Some financial-transaction taxes 
have also been used as surrogate for value-added taxation or simply to raise revenue in a 
less politically contentious manner.
Transfer taxes on assets and securities distort capital markets in significant ways. Asset-
transfer taxes are similar to sales taxes on capital purchases, increasing the cost of buying 
capital and deterring investment. They also affect the mobility of companies, since 
companies pay a penalty when they change locations for business purposes. Security-
transfer taxes can hurt investors who rebalance their portfolios to improve investment 
returns, similar to the way that investors will avoid capital gains taxes by holding old assets 
producing inferior returns. 
In Table 3 below, we provide an assessment of transfer taxes on METRs for all countries, 
illustrating the impact that these transfer taxes have when they are included in the METR 
calculation.35 Once incorporating the land-transfer tax in Canada, averaged across 
provinces, the Canadian METR in 2015 rises by one percentage point from 20.0 to 21.0 
per cent. Industrialized countries with the largest transfer taxes resulting in an increase of 
more than three percentage points in the METR include Australia (3.2 points), the Czech 
Republic (3.0 points), Finland (3.4 points), Germany (3.1 points), Luxembourg (5.4 points), 
the Netherlands (4.1 points) Portugal (4.3 points) and Sweden (3.2 points). 
By and large, the largest impact tends to be related to asset-based transfer taxes (typically 
on real estate) with relatively high rates. Financial-transaction taxes tend to have a relatively 
small impact on the METR, by raising financing costs for firms. 
35 
Just to reiterate, this is a new undertaking for the 2015 METR estimates, and applies only to the “alternate model” estimates 
for 2015, which are specifically noted to include transfer taxes. 
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TABLE 3 METR INCLUSIVE AND EXCLUSIVE OF TRANSFER TAXES FOR 2015
2015 Base Model Alternate Model Difference Ranking Overall METR (Descending)
      Base Alt
Australia 25.7 28.9 3.2 17 16
Austria 23.5 26.3 2.8 23 24
Belgium 18.4 18.4 0.0 40 55
Canada 20.0 21.0 1.0 35 43
Chile 6.8 7.0 0.2 87 88
Czech Republic 12.1 15.1 3.0 69 67
Denmark 17.0 17.0 0.0 46 60
Estonia 10.6 10.6 0.0 74 80
Finland 12.6 16.0 3.4 67 62
France 36.1 36.6 0.5 5 6
Germany 23.8 26.9 3.1 22 21
Greece 11.3 11.6 0.3 72 78
Hungary 15.1 15.1 0.0 53 68
Iceland 12.7 13.9 1.2 64 70
Ireland 10.4 13.0 2.6 75 74
Israel 15.5 15.5 0.0 51 65
Italy 8.3 8.3 0.0 84 84
Japan 42.1 42.1 0.0 4 4
Korea S. 24.1 24.4 0.3 20 30
Luxembourg 12.5 17.9 5.4 68 58
Mexico 17.3 19.7 2.4 43 48
Netherlands 17.1 21.2 4.1 45 41
New Zealand 20.9 20.9 0.0 33 44
Norway 23.0 24.6 1.6 26 28
Poland 11.5 11.6 0.1 71 77
Portugal 20.9 25.2 4.3 32 27
Slovak Republic 15.6 15.6 0.0 50 64
Slovenia 5.4 5.4 0.0 89 90
Spain 22.2 23.2 1.0 29 33
Sweden 15.2 18.2 3.0 52 56
Switzerland 10.0 10.3 0.3 79 81
Turkey 5.7 7.1 1.4 88 87
United Kingdom 22.9 25.6 2.7 27 25
United States 34.6 34.6 0.0 6 9
 
Brazil 45.5 46.9 1.4 3 3
China 24.1 28.9 4.8 21 17
India 57.1 61.9 4.8 1 1
Russia 29.0 29.0 0.0 11 15
 
Argentina 33.9 37.8 3.9 8 5
Bolivia 24.3 27.2 2.9 18 19
Botswana 13.4 26.9 13.5 61 23
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Bulgaria 6.8 8.3 1.5 86 85
Chad 27.2 36.2 9.0 14 7
Colombia 16.7 20.3 3.6 47 46
Costa Rica 26.0 26.9 0.9 16 20
Croatia 13.2 17.1 3.9 62 59
Dominican Republic 22.9 24.4 1.5 28 29
Ecuador 33.8 35.9 2.1 9 8
Egypt 7.9 7.9 0.0 85 86
Ethiopia 14.0 15.8 1.8 56 63
Fiji 13.0 13.0 0.0 63 73
Georgia 23.2 23.2 0.0 25 34
Ghana 10.2 10.7 0.5 76 79
Guyana 34.5 34.5 0.0 7 10
Hong Kong 0.9 5.6 4.7 92 89
Indonesia 19.7 23.3 3.6 36 32
Iran 10.1 18.1 8.0 77 57
Jamaica 28.7 32.0 3.3 12 12
Jordan 10.1 10.1 0.0 78 82
Kazakhstan 26.9 26.9 0.0 15 22
Kenya 15.0 19.2 4.2 54 52
Kuwait 9.8 9.8 0.0 80 83
Latvia 17.8 19.4 1.6 41 50
Lesotho 24.1 24.1 0.0 19 31
Madagascar 12.7 21.8 9.1 65 37
Malaysia 17.2 23.0 5.8 44 35
Morocco 13.7 33.1 19.4 58 11
Nigeria 12.7 13.1 0.4 66 72
Pakistan 30.3 31.6 1.3 10 13
Panama 21.3 21.3 0.0 31 40
Paraguay 13.6 13.6 0.0 59 71
Peru 21.3 21.3 0.0 30 39
Philippines 28.0 28.3 0.3 13 18
Qatar 5.2 5.2 0.0 90 91
Romania 3.4 3.4 0.0 91 92
Rwanda 18.8 18.8 0.0 39 54
Saudi Arabia 19.0 19.0 0.0 38 53
Serbia 10.6 12.4 1.8 73 75
Sierra Leone 16.6 16.6 0.0 48 61
Singapore 9.3 21.8 12.5 82 36
South Africa 14.2 14.3 0.1 55 69
Tanzania 20.3 21.7 1.4 34 38
Thailand 9.8 30.8 21.0 81 14
Trinidad and Tobago 13.4 19.9 6.5 60 47
Tunisia 16.0 19.6 3.6 49 49
Uganda 19.6 21.1 1.5 37 42
Ukraine 13.8 15.4 1.6 57 66
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Uruguay 23.4 25.4 2.0 24 26
Uzbekistan 49.0 49.0 0.0 2 2
Venezuela 17.6 19.3 1.7 42 51
Vietnam 11.8 12.2 0.4 70 76
Zambia 8.5 20.4 11.9 83 45
 
G7* 26.8 27.9 1.1
G20* 26.5 28.2 1.7
OECD* 17.7 19.1 1.4
*Simple average. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Base model excludes transfer taxes. Alternative (“alt”) model includes transfer taxes. 
FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL CORPORATE TAX POLICY
Unlike many countries, Canadian provinces (and local governments) levy significant taxes 
on businesses, including: corporate income taxes, capital taxes (primarily on financial 
institutions), property taxes, and sales taxes on capital purchases. Canadian provincial 
general corporate income tax rates, now averaging close to 12 per cent, are not far off the 
federal rate of 15 per cent. 
Taking into account both federal and provincial tax burdens (except for local property taxes 
that cannot be measured by industry or time), Canada’s corporate tax structure is highly 
favourable to manufacturing compared to services (i.e., construction, communications, 
transportation, utilities, trade and other services). The advantage given to manufacturing 
investment is much larger compared to that in most other countries, with the exceptions 
of Ethiopia, Iran, Kenya and Trinidad and Tobago (Figure 6; see also Table A.3 in the 
appendix). Among G7 countries, except for Canada, there is little difference in METRs 
between manufacturing and services (with the U.S. having the second-largest difference, 
after Canada, with 3.9 percentage points in the METR in favour of manufacturing). For 
the G20 as a whole, the difference in manufacturing and service-sector METRs is only 0.4 
percentage points in favour of manufacturing and, for the OECD, 0.6 percentage points. 
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FIGURE 6 MANUFACTURING AND SERVICE METRS FOR OECD COUNTRIES
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Canada is a clear outlier in terms of its support for the manufacturing sector (forestry also 
is treated favourably, as will be shown below). Despite this tax support, manufacturing’s 
share of value added as share of GDP has fallen for four decades due to other factors, 
including the falling global cost competitiveness and the shift of production to non-OECD 
countries.36
As seen in Figure 6 (and in the appendix), Canada has one of the lowest METRs on 
manufacturing among industrialized economies. It also has one of the highest tax burdens 
on investment in service industries (the highest METRs on services are in Japan, France, 
the U.S., Australia and Austria). The service sector is important to competitiveness, playing 
a critical role in facilitating innovation, infrastructure and trade. 
Canada’s corporate tax system is non-neutral across business activities, resulting in a 
misallocation of capital resources towards tax-favoured sectors. As shown in tables 4 and 
5 for 2016, METRs, excluding transfer taxes, vary substantially across sectors and assets 
(2015 METRs are provided as well in Table A.5 the appendix). Forestry and manufacturing 
are least taxed, due to the effect of accelerated depreciation for manufacturing equipment 
and some provincial investment tax credits. Other services (household and business 
services) are most heavily taxed, followed by construction and communications.37 
36 
See M. Krzepkowski and J. Mintz, “Canadian Manufacturing Malaise: Three Hypotheses,” University of Calgary School of 
Public Policy Research Paper 6, 12 (2013).
37 
Although financial and non-renewable resource industries are not included in this global analysis, we have estimated that 
the METR for the financial sector is highest in Canada, followed by oil and gas. Mining is one of the least-taxed sectors. See 
Mintz, Bazel and Chen, “Growing”; Crisan and Mintz “Alberta’s”; and Mintz and Nikolakakis, “Tax Policy.”
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TABLE 4 METRS BY PROVINCE AND SECTOR FOR 2016 (LAND-TRANSFER TAX EXCLUDED)
2016 Agriculture Forestry
Electrical 
Power, Gas  
& Water
Construction Manufacturing Wholesale Trade
Retail 
Trade
Transportation 
and Storage Communications
Other 
services Aggregate
Canada* 18.8% 9.0% 19.6% 25.0% 12.4% 23.4% 23.8% 20.1% 24.2% 25.2% 20.1%
Newfoundland 12.5% -30.5% 0.0% 25.5% -20.3% 24.5% 24.8% 20.3% 23.0% 22.6% 14.1%
Prince Edward 
Island 3.8% -103.6% 0.0% 26.4% -75.3% 25.6% 25.9% 23.2% 23.0% 26.9% 12.0%
Nova Scotia 13.8% -13.9% 21.9% 26.4% -7.4% 25.3% 25.7% 21.1% 23.9% 23.7% 16.7%
New Brunswick 4.8% -30.8% 20.3% 24.6% -21.7% 23.6% 23.9% 19.3% 22.2% 21.9% 8.4%
Quebec 18.2% 4.5% 18.7% 22.7% 8.5% 22.1% 22.4% 17.0% 20.4% 24.6% 17.1%
Ontario 17.8% 12.9% 18.2% 22.3% 14.6% 21.3% 21.8% 17.5% 20.0% 23.3% 18.9%
Manitoba 24.4% 6.3% 24.8% 36.8% 6.7% 31.1% 30.8% 28.6% 40.3% 37.3% 28.4%
Saskatchewan 22.2% 13.1% 22.8% 32.1% 15.0% 29.0% 28.2% 23.5% 35.4% 31.1% 24.8%
Alberta 18.1% 14.7% 18.7% 22.8% 17.6% 21.8% 22.2% 18.1% 20.5% 20.3% 19.3%
British  
Columbia 23.4% 17.9% 23.5% 34.6% 20.2% 29.4% 29.1% 24.4% 37.5% 33.1% 27.9%
 
Note: Cases with a zero per cent METR result from negligible capital weights.
TABLE 5 METRS BY ASSET AND PROVINCE FOR 2016 
2016 Buildings M&E Land Inventory Aggregate
Canada* 22.7% 19.0% 10.8% 24.7% 20.1%
Newfoundland 20.7% 5.5% 12.5% 27.8% 14.1%
Prince Edward Island 21.8% -7.2% 13.0% 28.7% 12.0%
Nova Scotia 22.5% 8.9% 13.0% 28.8% 16.7%
New Brunswick 17.8% -9.1% 12.0% 27.0% 8.4%
Quebec 22.5% 11.3% 10.9% 25.0% 17.1%
Ontario 21.5% 17.4% 10.6% 24.1% 18.9%
Manitoba 24.0% 35.0% 11.0% 25.0% 28.4%
Saskatchewan 23.7% 28.3% 10.8% 24.3% 24.8%
Alberta 22.7% 17.4% 11.0% 25.0% 19.3%
British Columbia 26.6% 33.7% 10.5% 24.1% 27.9%
It can also be seen that the Atlantic provinces have the lowest METRs in aggregate 
(New Brunswick being lowest), largely driven by federal and provincial tax preferences 
in manufacturing and forestry. Manitoba, British Columbia and Saskatchewan have the 
highest METRs, reflecting the importance of retail sales taxes on capital purchases in these 
provinces. As shown in Table A.3 in the appendix, Manitoba has the fourth-highest METR 
among OECD countries in 2015; British Columbia is the fifth highest; and Saskatchewan is 
the seventh highest in ranking. 
In general most provinces have been increasing taxes on capital. Of note, 
• Newfoundland and Labrador has increased its corporate income tax rates to deal with 
its deficits.
• New Brunswick has almost doubled its tax on capital in the past three years, in large 
part by increasing the corporate income tax from 10 to 14 per cent in 2014 and 2016. 
While its low METR reflects preferential treatment of manufacturing and forestry, 
other sectors are taxed much more heavily, more so than Quebec and Ontario.
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• Quebec has increased its tax burden on capital by scaling back some incentives. It is 
planning to reduce its corporate income tax rate from 11.9 to 11.5 per cent in the next 
few years.
• Manitoba’s METR rose due to an increase in its retail sales tax from seven to eight 
per cent.
• Alberta raised its corporate income tax in 2015, pushing up its effective tax rate 2.3 
percentage points to 19.3 per cent, above that of Ontario and Quebec.
• British Columbia’s METR jumped up dramatically, almost 10 points, after 2012, due 
to it reinstituting the retail sales tax and its cancellation of the Harmonized Sales Tax, 
resulting in higher sales taxes on capital-goods purchases. This rise was also due to 
B.C. raising the corporate income tax rate by a point. 
TABLE 6 METRS BY PROVINCES 2005–16
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Trend
Canada* 20.1% 20.0% 19.0% 18.6% 17.4% 18.7% 19.8% 27.3% 28.0% 30.9% 36.2% 38.8%
Newfoundland 14.1% 11.4% 10.7% 10.7% 10.7% 12.1% 13.1% 14.7% 15.5% 18.4% 22.1% 21.1%
Prince Edward Island 12.0% 12.0% 11.2% 11.4% 28.1% 29.2% 29.8% 30.7% 31.2% 33.4% 37.0% 37.5%
Nova Scotia 16.7% 16.7% 13.4% 6.9% 6.9% 9.6% 11.6% 19.6% 21.0% 24.2% 29.3% 28.1%
New Brunswick 8.4% 6.3% 4.8% 3.8% 2.8% 4.3% 6.3% 8.6% 16.9% 21.0% 27.1% 22.3%
Quebec 17.1% 17.1% 15.9% 15.2% 15.2% 17.5% 18.5% 19.9% 21.1% 26.2% 33.7% 36.1%
Ontario 18.9% 18.9% 18.2% 18.2% 18.2% 19.3% 20.3% 32.9% 33.2% 35.1% 40.7% 43.3%
Manitoba 28.4% 28.4% 27.9% 26.2% 26.2% 27.2% 29.8% 31.1% 33.0% 36.3% 40.6% 39.6%
Saskatchewan 24.8% 24.8% 24.3% 24.3% 24.3% 25.3% 26.0% 26.3% 26.8% 31.4% 38.3% 43.7%
Alberta 19.3% 19.3% 17.0% 17.0% 17.0% 18.2% 19.0% 20.0% 20.6% 23.0% 26.6% 31.7%
British Columbia 27.9% 27.9% 27.5% 27.5% 17.8% 19.0% 19.9% 29.1% 29.5% 32.2% 35.2% 39.2%
CORPORATE TAX REFORM OPPORTUNITIES
Canada is beginning to lose its tax competitiveness by increasing the tax burden on 
investment as well as maintaining a distortionary tax system favouring some sectors over 
others. The federal government is reviewing tax expenditures for the next budget, while 
British Columbia has created a panel to recommend options to make its business tax 
structure more competitive. 
We agree that Canada’s corporate tax system could be further reformed to improve 
competitiveness and neutrality.38 Some substantial reforms have been suggested, such 
as moving the corporate income tax to a rent-based tax,39 although there are difficult 
challenges with this, especially from an international perspective as well as with regard to 
ensuring consistency with the personal income tax system. Other levies could be considered 
38 
See J. Mintz, “An Agenda for Corporate Tax Reform” (Business Council of Canada, 2015); and J. Mintz and S. Richardson, 
“Directions for Corporate Tax Reform in Canada,” manuscript (2016). These papers elaborate on the points provided in this 
paper’s brief section.
39 
See, for example, R. Boadway and J.F. Tremblay, “Corporate Tax Reform: Issues and Prospects for Canada,” Mowat 
Research Paper 88 (University of Toronto, 2014); and K. Milligan, “Tax Policy for a New Era: Promoting Economic Growth 
and Fairness,” C. D. Howe Benefactors Lecture, C. D. Howe Institute, Toronto, Ontario, November 25, 2014.
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to replace the corporate income tax, such as introducing transfer and capital taxes, but these 
would make the business tax system worse rather than better.
In our view, the Canadian corporate tax system can be improved but does not require major 
surgery. Today, it is a matter of addressing significant non-neutralities in the tax system and 
maintaining internationally competitive tax rates. 
The most important non-neutralities in the corporate tax system include the following:
• Accelerated depreciation and investment tax credits that favour manufacturing and 
resource sectors, resulting in a misallocation of capital away from services, despite the 
latter sectors being just as important as other sectors to today’s innovation and trading 
economy. These should be curtailed, as Quebec is doing, or even better, eliminated 
altogether to improve neutrality in the corporate tax system.
• Although not a focus in this paper, the significant difference in corporate income 
tax rates between small and large businesses has created a tax wall, hurting business 
growth and productivity by encouraging businesses to stay small.40 The federal 
corporate income tax on small businesses is 4.5 percentage points less than the 
general rate. Provincial small business tax rates are substantially below the provincial 
general rate, the most egregious cases being Nova Scotia (13 points), Manitoba and 
Newfoundland (12 points), Prince Edward Island (11.5 points) and New Brunswick 
(10.5 points). 
• Capital taxes on the financial sector are distortive and out of line with most other 
countries. 
• Retail sales taxes on capital purchases in British Columbia, Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan result in these provinces having some of the highest tax burdens on 
investments among OECD countries.
• Provincial and municipal property taxes on non-residential property (net of municipal 
service benefits) are significantly higher than non-residential property, encouraging 
businesses to shift locations to lower-taxed neighbouring jurisdictions or away from 
business centres to reduce property tax costs.41 
If governments were to curtail “tax expenditures” by reducing tax incentives, it would be 
best to use the revenue to reduce the general rate further. It would be specifically wise to 
move to a single corporate income tax rate on all businesses, which would also reduce the 
necessity of different tax credits for eligible and non-eligible dividends. 
For example, the federal rate could be reduced from 15 to 13 per cent by scaling back 
accelerated depreciation and other tax preferences at the federal level on a revenue-neutral 
basis. Provinces could adopt a single corporate income tax rate on all businesses that would 
also be fiscally neutral.42 This would simplify the business tax structure as well as make it 
more efficient and neutral.
40 
D. Chen and J. Mintz, “Small Business Taxation: Revamping Incentives to Encourage Growth,” University of Calgary 
School of Public Policy Research Paper 4, 7 (2011). The difference between small and large METRs is 4.1 percentage points 
in 2014 for Canada on average (see Mintz, “An Agenda”). New results will be forthcoming. 
41 
See A. Found, P. Tomlison and B. Dachis, “Business Tax Burdens in Canada’s Major Cities: The 2015 Report Card” 
(Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute, November 24, 2015).
42 
Mintz, “An Agenda for Corporate Tax Reform.”
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THEORETICAL AND DATA APPENDIX
DESCRIPTION OF THEORY:
The marginal-effective-tax-rate analysis is based on a model of a firm maximizing its 
market value of cash flows discounted by a weighted average cost of finance, determined by 
an optimal financial policy. All values are in certainty-equivalent terms with the firm being 
able to use any marginal tax losses and tax credits to reduce tax liabilities. Capital decisions 
are determined at a point where the return on capital net of depreciation and income-risk 
premium is equal to the cost of finance. The cost of finance is the weighted average of the 
after-cost of debt and equity, trading-off the tax benefits of issuing debt with bankruptcy 
and agency costs. An optimal dividend-payout policy determining the cost of equity finance 
is based on information conveyed to the market.43 The model incorporates corporate income 
tax provisions, capital taxes based on gross or net assets, sales taxes on capital purchases 
and transfer taxes. 
Basic Model (excluding transfer taxes):
The METR includes the following taxes and their provisions:
• Corporate income tax: 
 ◦ Tax rate (u).
 ◦ Present value of tax savings from tax depreciation: (uZ) discounted by Rf. If 
declining-balance depreciation: Z=α/(α+Rf).
 ◦ Initial allowance (IA) or investment tax credit: IA=ɸ/(1-u) to convert tax credits 
into initial allowances or vice versa. 
 ◦ Inventory deduction (FIFO, LIFO (replacement cost) or average cost). 
 ◦ Interest deduction (which can be limited, such as with indexation).
 ◦ Nominal cost of finance is the weighted average of debt and equity finance, with 
the simplest form being: Rf = Bi(1-u)+(1-B)ρ with ρ/(1-τ) with τ=atd + (1-a)c 
(weighted average of the cost of equity and debt finance paid under the personal 
income tax).
 ◦ Real cost of finance (nominal cost less inflation): rf= Rf-π.
 ◦ The capital-related income risk premium, which could vary by industry and asset, 
is reduced by the corporate income tax rate assuming the firm is “fully taxpaying”: 
H(1-u).
• Capital taxes are treated in the model as the present value of capital tax (wealth tax, 
tax on fixed assets (excluding inventories), gross asset tax) at rate tc. Usually the 
capital tax is discounted by the nominal cost of finance, Rf, and declines as capital 
depreciates. Capital taxes are typically deductible from corporate income (we adjust 
for cases in which they are not deductible) and are paid annually, so the formula is:  
43 
For further elaboration, see J. Mintz, “The Corporation Tax: A Survey,” Fiscal Studies 16, 4 (1995): 23-68.
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(1-ξB) tc/(Rf+δ), with ξ=1 being the case where the capital tax applies to net assets, 
and ξ=0 being the case when it is applied to gross assets.  
 
Capital taxes apply to the book value of assets (where the economic depreciation 
rate is relevant) or the tax value of assets (based on economic depreciation). Unless 
provided, there is no indexation for inflation. If the tax value of assets is used, one 
depreciates by α instead of δ,and reduces the asset base by any investment allowances 
(or investment tax credits).
• Sales taxes on capital purchases raise the price of purchasing capital from q to q(1+t), 
t=sales tax rate. Treating q= 1, the increase in capital cost is (1+t). 
• Gross-receipts taxes that do not allow for the deduction of capital costs are applied at 
the rate k (if they are deductible from the corporate income base the effective rate is 
k(1-u).
• Distribution taxes at rate z on dividends paid to all types of shareholders, whether 
resident or non-resident, increase the cost of financing. The share of profits paid out as 
dividends is equal to a. 
The following equations are used to determine the METR for the basic model:
• F’/q = (1+t)(δ+rf)(1-A)/(1-u-k(1-ωu)) + H.
• rf =Bi(1-u)+ρ/(1-az) – π.
• A= u[IA +(1-IA)Z] – (1-ξB)tc(1-u)/(Rf+δ)].
As for inventories, this is a case where δ=0, but we add on the tax on inflation depending 
on FIFO, average cost, or LIFO. 
Gross return on capital is Rg = F’/q – δ - H. The net return is the gross return with all 
corporate (not personal) tax parameters equal to zero: Rn =Bi+(1-B)ρ – π.
The METR is defined as T= (Rg-Rn)/Rg.
Augmented Model
Transaction taxes are defined as follows:
• Transfer taxes on fixed assets: Transfer taxes apply to real estate (land and 
buildings), land only (land taxes) and/or property (real estate and other fixed 
assets). Rarely do transfer taxes apply to inventories. The rate can be included in t 
for sales taxes on capital goods in the above formula. Transfer taxes are typically 
not deductible, but they increase the purchase cost of the asset and are therefore 
depreciated. 
• Transfer taxes on securities raise the cost of purchasing financial assets, much like 
a sales tax. They include stamp duties and registration taxes for securities. They are 
deductible similar to other expenses when incurred. The nominal cost of finance Rf  
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is increased by (1+ϒϟ(1-u)), with ϒ being the transfer tax rate. They can be on bonds 
only (B), new equity issues (1-B)a or both (B+(1-B)a) implying that ϟ is the following:
Ϟ= B for transfer taxes on debt.
Ϟ= (1-B)a for new equity only.
Ϟ= B + Ba for debt and new equity issues.
• Financial transactions are annual payments on financial securities (they differ from 
capital taxes that apply to real assets). The tax rate paid annually is ϭ, which is applied 
to debt, equity or both. Financial-transaction taxes increase the cost of finance each 
year in Rf.
With these transaction taxes, the new formulas can be written as follows:
1. F’/q = (1+t)(δ+rf)(1-A)/(1-u-k(1-ωu)) +H.
2. Rf =[B{i+ϭ](1-u)+ρ/(1-az)](1+ϒϟ(1-u)). 
3. rf= Rf – π. 
4. A= u[IA +(1-IA)Z] – (1-ξB)tc(1-u)/(Rf+δ).
The METR is measured by calculating the gross and net rates of return to capital. The gross 
return on capital is Rg = F’/q – δ - H. The net return is the gross return with all corporate 
(not personal) tax parameters equal to zero: Rn =Bi+(1-B)ρ – π.
The METR is defined as T= (Rg-Rn)/Rg.
Primary Sources Include 
• Parameters concerning an individual nation’s tax regime are taken from a 
combination of the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide published by Ernst & Young and 
PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries. 
• Corporate income tax rates are taken from KPMG’s online “Corporate tax rates 
table.”
• GDP data are taken from the UN’s online database, unstats.un.org.
• Inflation data are taken from the World Bank’s online “World Development 
Indicators.”
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TABLE A.1 GENERAL CENTRAL-SUBNATIONAL CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES BY YEAR
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Trend
Australia 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
Austria 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Belgium 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0
Canada 34.2 33.9 34.0 31.4 31.0 29.4 27.6 26.1 26.3 26.3 26.6
Chile 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 20.0 17.5 20.0 21.0 22.5
Czech Republic 26.0 24.0 24.0 21.0 20.0 19.0 19.0 19.7 19.0 19.0 19.0
Denmark 28.0 28.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 24.5 23.5
Estonia 24.0 23.0 22.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 20.0
Finland 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 25.7 24.5 20.0 20.0
France 35.0 34.4 34.4 34.4 34.4 34.4 36.1 34.7 36.1 36.9 38.0
Germany 38.9 38.9 38.9 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2 29.7
Greece 32.0 29.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 24.0 20.0 24.6 26.0 26.0 29.0
Hungary 16.0 17.3 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.0 19.0 19.8 19.0 19.0 19.0
Iceland 18.0 18.0 18.0 15.0 15.0 18.0 20.0 15.6 20.0 20.0 20.0
Ireland 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5
Israel 31.0 31.0 29.0 27.0 26.0 25.0 24.0 25.8 25.0 26.5 26.5
Italy 37.3 37.3 37.3 31.4 31.3 31.3 31.3 31.3 31.4 31.4 31.4
Japan 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 37.0 37.0 33.1
Korea S. 27.5 27.5 27.5 27.5 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2
Luxembourg 30.4 29.6 29.6 29.6 28.6 28.6 28.8 28.6 29.2 29.2 30.0
Mexico 30.0 29.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 30.0 30.0 28.4 30.0 30.0 30.0
Netherlands 31.5 29.6 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.0 25.0
New Zealand 33.0 33.0 33.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 28.0 29.7 28.0 28.0 28.0
Norway 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 27.0 27.0
Poland 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0
Portugal 27.5 27.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 29.0 29.0 27.2 31.5 31.5 29.5
Slovak Republic 20.4 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 23.0 24.0 24.0
Slovenia 25.0 24.0 23.0 22.0 21.0 20.0 20.0 20.3 17.0 17.0 17.0
Spain 35.0 35.0 32.5 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 28.0
Sweden 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 22.0 22.0 22.0
Switzerland 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.1 17.9
Turkey 30.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
United Kingdom 30.0 30.0 30.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 26.0 27.5 23.0 21.0 20.0
United States 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.1 39.2 39.2 39.1 39.1 39.1 39.1
Brazil 27.8 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0
China 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
India 36.6 33.7 34.0 34.0 34.0 33.2 32.4 33.7 34.0 34.0 34.6
Russia 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
Argentina 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0
Bolivia 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Botswana 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 21.4 21.4 21.4
Bulgaria 15.0 15.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Trend
Chad 45.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0
Colombia 35.0 35.0 34.0 33.0 33.0 33.0 33.0 33.0 34.0 34.0 34.5
Costa Rica 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
Croatia 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 30.0
Dominican Republic 25.0 30.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 29.0 25.8 29.0 28.0 27.0
Ecuador 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 14.0 14.6 12.0 12.0 12.0
Egypt 34.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 25.0 25.0 23.1
Ethiopia 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
Fiji 31.0 31.0 31.0 31.0 29.0 28.0 28.0 27.5 20.0 20.0 20.0
Georgia 20.0 20.0 20.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
Ghana 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Guyana 39.0 39.0 39.0 39.0 39.0 39.0 39.0 39.0 39.0 39.0 39.0
Hong Kong 17.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5
Indonesia 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 28.0 25.0 25.0 27.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Iran 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 28.0
Jamaica 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 30.0 25.0 27.9
Jordan 21.7 21.7 21.7 21.7 21.7 14.9 14.9 21.5 14.9 14.9 19.0
Kazakhstan 40.5 40.5 40.5 40.5 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0
Kenya 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
Kuwait 55.0 55.0 55.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 17.0
Latvia 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
Lesotho 31.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0
Madagascar 30.0 30.0 30.0 25.0 24.0 23.0 22.0 23.4 20.0 20.0 20.0
Malaysia 28.0 28.0 27.0 26.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Morocco 35.0 35.0 35.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 31.4
Nigeria 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0
Pakistan 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 34.0 33.0
Panama 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 27.5 25.0 29.7 25.0 25.0 25.0
Paraguay 30.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Peru 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 28.0
Philippines 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
Qatar 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 10.0 10.0 31.3 10.0 10.0 10.0
Romania 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0
Rwanda 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
Saudi Arabia 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
Serbia 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
Sierra Leone 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
Singapore 20.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 17.0 17.0 17.7 17.0 17.0 17.0
South Africa 30.0 29.0 29.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0
Tanzania 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
Thailand 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 27.6 20.0 20.0 20.0
Trinidad and Tobago 30.0 30.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Tunisia 35.0 35.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 25.0 26.2
Uganda 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
Ukraine 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 23.0 24.1 19.0 19.0 18.0
29
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Trend
Uruguay 30.0 30.0 30.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Uzbekistan 19.0 19.0 17.2 17.2 17.2 16.3 16.3 17.0 16.3 15.4 14.9
Venezuela 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.5
Vietnam 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 22.0 22.0
Zambia 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0
G7* 36.3 36.2 36.2 33.5 33.4 33.1 32.8 32.6 31.9 31.7 31.1
G7 w 37.9 37.9 37.9 36.4 36.3 36.3 36.2 36.1 35.4 35.3 34.6
G20* 31.5 31.0 30.9 29.9 29.5 29.3 29.1 29.1 28.9 28.8 28.6
G20 w 35.2 35.0 35.0 33.9 33.7 33.7 33.6 33.6 33.1 33.0 32.5
OECD* 28.2 27.7 27.2 26.1 25.9 25.9 25.8 25.7 25.7 25.5 25.3
OECD  w 35.7 35.4 35.2 34.0 33.8 33.8 33.7 33.6 33.1 33.0 32.4
92 Country* 28.6 27.9 27.4 26.4 26.0 25.6 25.5 25.8 25.2 25.0 25.0
 
* = Simple average, w= GDP-weighted average.
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TABLE A.2 MARGINAL EFFECTIVE RATES BY COUNTRY AND YEAR
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Trend
Australia 25.7 25.7 25.7 25.7 25.7 25.7 25.7 25.7 25.7 25.7 25.7
Austria 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5
Belgium 18.4 15.3 15.3 15.3 15.3 15.3 15.3 15.3 14.6 14.6 22.9
Canada 20.0 19.0 18.8 17.5 18.8 19.9 27.3 28.0 30.9 36.2 38.8
Chile 6.8 6.2 5.9 5.0 5.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8
Czech Republic 12.1 12.1 12.1 12.6 12.1 12.1 12.8 13.5 15.7 15.7 17.2
Denmark 17.0 17.7 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.2 20.6 20.6
Estonia 10.6 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 12.0 12.7 13.4
Finland 12.6 12.6 15.9 16.7 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0
France 36.1 35.4 34.8 34.8 34.8 33.7 34.8 34.8 34.8 33.8 35.1
Germany 23.8 24.3 24.3 24.3 24.3 24.3 24.3 24.3 33.8 33.8 33.8
Greece 11.3 14.0 14.1 13.4 11.2 13.1 13.6 13.6 13.6 15.6 17.3
Hungary 15.1 14.3 14.3 14.6 14.3 14.3 14.7 14.7 14.7 14.3 13.2
Iceland 12.7 12.7 12.7 9.7 12.7 11.3 9.4 9.4 11.3 11.3 11.3
Ireland 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4
Israel 15.5 15.5 14.5 15.0 13.8 14.5 15.1 15.8 17.3 18.7 18.7
Italy 8.3 12.9 21.2 26.8 27.2 27.2 27.2 27.3 32.5 32.5 32.5
Japan 42.1 44.3 44.3 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8
Korea S. 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9
Luxembourg 12.5 12.0 12.0 11.5 11.7 11.5 11.5 13.3 14.4 14.4 14.9
Mexico 17.3 17.3 17.4 16.3 17.4 17.4 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.7 17.4
Netherlands 17.1 17.1 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 20.7 22.2
New Zealand 20.9 20.9 20.9 18.7 20.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 20.1 20.1 20.1
Norway 23.0 23.0 23.9 23.9 23.9 23.9 23.9 23.9 23.9 23.9 23.9
Poland 11.5 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3
Portugal 20.9 22.5 22.6 19.1 20.5 20.5 18.6 18.6 18.6 19.3 19.3
Slovak Republic 15.6 15.6 14.9 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.0
Slovenia 5.4 5.4 5.4 6.8 6.6 6.6 7.1 7.5 13.3 14.0 14.7
Spain 22.2 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 26.2 28.4 28.4
Sweden 15.2 15.2 15.2 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 19.8 19.8 19.8 19.8
Switzerland 10.0 15.3 15.3 15.3 15.3 15.3 15.3 15.3 15.9 15.9 15.9
Turkey 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 11.0
United Kingdom 22.9 23.4 25.5 28.4 26.8 28.7 28.6 28.4 29.7 29.7 29.7
United States 34.6 34.6 34.6 34.6 34.6 34.6 34.9 34.9 34.9 35.2 35.2
 
Brazil 45.5 41.7 42.9 42.1 42.0 41.5 41.4 40.1 42.3 42.3 42.3
China 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 48.3 48.3 48.3 48.3
India 57.1 57.5 59.2 59.0 58.4 58.8 59.2 59.2 59.2 56.0 57.7
Russia 29.0 29.0 28.9 28.9 28.9 28.9 28.9 32.6 32.6 32.6 34.8
 
Argentina 33.9 33.2 33.2 33.2 33.2 33.2 33.2 33.2 33.2 33.2 36.8
Bolivia 24.3 21.4 21.4 21.4 21.4 21.4 21.4 21.4 21.4 21.4 21.4
Botswana 13.4 12.8 12.9 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8
Bulgaria 6.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 7.7 7.7
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2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Trend
Chad 27.2 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 39.0
Colombia 16.7 34.2 36.8 32.8 36.1 31.6 32.0 33.1 34.6 26.5 26.5
Costa Rica 26.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Croatia 13.2 8.8 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9
Dominican Republic 22.9 23.8 24.8 23.6 26.6 22.8 22.8 22.8 22.8 27.5 22.8
Ecuador 33.8 30.0 35.9 37.9 37.4 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1
Egypt 7.9 5.5 5.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 10.4
Ethiopia 14.0 14.0 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3
Fiji 13.0 13.0 13.0 18.6 19.1 19.1 19.9 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6
Georgia 23.2 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 22.6 22.6 22.6
Ghana 10.2 10.2 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4
Guyana 34.5 34.8 34.8 34.8 38.0 34.8 34.8 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0
Hong Kong 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1
Indonesia 19.7 19.7 19.8 21.5 19.8 19.8 22.4 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2
Iran 10.1 8.7 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2
Jamaica 28.7 13.8 17.7 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.3
Jordan 10.1 9.1 9.1 17.5 9.1 9.1 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9
Kazakhstan 26.9 21.7 21.8 21.8 21.8 21.8 21.8 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Kenya 15.0 15.0 15.1 15.1 15.1 15.1 15.1 15.1 15.1 15.1 15.1
Kuwait 9.8 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 44.9 44.9 44.9
Latvia 17.8 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2
Lesotho 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 33.7
Madagascar 12.7 12.7 12.7 15.2 14.2 15.0 15.7 16.5 20.5 20.5 20.5
Malaysia 17.2 17.2 17.2 17.2 17.2 17.2 17.2 18.0 18.8 19.6 19.6
Morocco 13.7 12.8 12.9 12.9 12.9 12.9 12.9 12.9 15.9 15.9 15.9
Nigeria 12.7 12.7 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8
Pakistan 30.3 26.1 27.1 27.1 27.1 27.1 27.1 27.1 27.1 27.0 27.0
Panama 21.3 17.4 17.4 21.2 17.4 19.4 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5
Paraguay 13.6 7.8 7.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 25.0
Peru 21.3 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.2
Philippines 28.0 24.0 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 28.6 28.6 28.6 29.0
Qatar 5.2 5.2 5.2 18.7 5.2 5.2 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6
Romania 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Rwanda 18.8 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3
Saudi Arabia 19.0 19.0 19.0 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.3
Serbia 10.6 10.6 10.6 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8
Sierra Leone 16.6 16.6 16.7 20.9 20.9 20.9 20.9 20.9 20.9 20.9 20.9
Singapore 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.8 9.3 9.3 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9 11.2
South Africa 14.2 14.2 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.9 14.9 15.6
Tanzania 20.3 18.8 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9
Thailand 9.8 9.8 9.8 14.3 16.1 16.1 16.1 16.1 16.1 16.1 16.1
Trinidad and Tobago 13.4 13.3 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.4 16.9 16.9
Tunisia 16.0 18.4 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 25.7 25.7
Uganda 19.6 14.8 14.9 14.9 14.9 14.9 14.9 14.9 14.9 14.9 14.9
Ukraine 13.8 9.3 9.3 12.4 11.8 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.1
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2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Trend
Uruguay 23.4 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 28.5 28.5 28.5
Uzbekistan 49.0 38.0 38.2 38.4 38.2 38.2 38.5 38.5 38.5 39.1 39.1
Venezuela 17.6 18.7 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2
Vietnam 11.8 11.2 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4
Zambia 8.5 8.5 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7
 
G7* 26.8 27.7 29.1 30.3 30.3 30.6 31.8 31.9 34.6 35.3 35.8
G7 w 31.8 32.5 33.1 33.8 33.8 33.9 34.4 34.4 35.9 36.1 36.3
G20* 26.5 26.6 27.3 27.8 27.7 27.8 28.3 30.0 31.1 31.3 32.2
G20 w 30.8 31.1 31.6 32.2 32.1 32.2 32.6 35.0 36.2 36.3 36.6
OECD* 17.7 18.1 18.5 18.6 18.7 18.7 18.9 19.1 20.2 20.7 21.4
OECD  w 28.5 29.1 29.6 30.2 30.2 30.3 30.6 30.7 31.9 32.3 32.7
 
92 Country* 18.6 18.0 18.6 19.1 19.0 18.9 19.3 19.9 20.9 21.2 21.9
 
* = Simple average, w= GDP-weighted average. 
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TABLE A.3 MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES BY COUNTRY: MANUFACTURING AND SERVICES (2005 AND 2015)
Overall Manufacturing Service Difference Overall Manufacturing Service Difference Effective  CIT Rate
Ranking Overall 
METR  
(Descending)
2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005
Australia 25.7 27.2 25.5 1.7 25.7 27.3 25.5 1.8 30.0 30.0 17 28
Austria 23.5 23.3 23.6 0.3 23.5 23.3 23.6 0.3 25.0 25.0 23 34
Belgium 18.4 17.7 18.6 0.9 22.9 22.0 23.1 1.1 34.0 34.0 40 35
Canada 20.0 12.3 23.1 10.8 38.8 35.4 41.8 6.4 26.6 34.2 35 8
Chile 6.8 7.5 6.7 0.8 4.8 5.3 4.7 0.6 22.5 17.0 87 90
Czech Republic 12.1 12.1 12.1 0.0 17.2 17.3 17.2 0.1 19.0 26.0 69 58
Denmark 17.0 18.6 16.7 1.9 20.6 22.4 20.3 2.1 23.5 28.0 46 44
Estonia 10.6 10.6 10.6 0.0 13.4 13.4 13.4 0.0 20.0 24.0 74 72
Finland 12.6 14.1 12.1 2.0 17.0 18.9 16.4 2.5 20.0 26.0 67 59
France 36.1 37.8 35.9 1.9 35.1 36.7 34.9 1.8 38.0 35.0 5 13
Germany 23.8 25.9 23.2 2.7 33.8 36.2 33.1 3.1 29.7 38.9 22 15
Greece 11.3 9.3 11.5 2.2 17.3 16.0 17.4 1.4 29.0 32.0 72 57
Hungary 15.1 15.8 14.9 0.9 13.2 13.8 13.0 0.8 19.0 16.0 53 74
Iceland 12.7 8.7 13.3 4.6 11.3 7.8 11.9 4.1 20.0 18.0 64 78
Ireland 10.4 9.6 10.6 1.0 10.4 9.6 10.6 1.0 12.5 12.5 75 81
Israel 15.5 13.6 15.8 2.2 18.7 16.6 19.1 2.5 26.5 31.0 51 53
Italy 8.3 8.6 8.3 0.3 32.5 30.5 33.0 2.5 31.4 37.3 84 17
Japan 42.1 41.4 42.3 0.9 45.8 45.3 46.0 0.7 33.1 39.5 4 3
Korea S. 24.1 26.0 23.2 2.8 26.9 29.0 25.9 3.1 24.2 27.5 20 25
Luxembourg 12.5 13.5 12.5 1.0 14.9 16.0 14.8 1.2 30.0 30.4 68 67
Mexico 17.3 18.9 17.0 1.9 17.4 18.9 17.0 1.9 30.0 30.0 43 56
Netherlands 17.1 16.0 17.3 1.3 22.2 20.9 22.4 1.5 25.0 31.5 45 38
New Zealand 20.9 21.5 20.8 0.7 20.1 17.9 20.5 2.6 28.0 33.0 33 48
Norway 23.0 21.6 23.2 1.6 23.9 22.4 24.1 1.7 27.0 28.0 26 33
Poland 11.5 10.2 11.9 1.7 13.3 12.2 13.7 1.5 19.0 19.0 71 73
Portugal 20.9 18.7 21.3 2.6 19.3 17.2 19.7 2.5 29.5 27.5 32 51
Slovak Republic 15.6 19.5 14.1 5.4 13.0 15.3 12.1 3.2 24.0 20.4 50 76
Slovenia 5.4 5.1 5.5 0.4 14.7 14.7 14.7 0.0 17.0 25.0 89 70
Spain 22.2 21.1 22.4 1.3 28.4 27.1 28.6 1.5 28.0 35.0 29 23
Sweden 15.2 13.9 15.5 1.6 19.8 18.3 20.2 1.9 22.0 28.0 52 49
Switzerland 10.0 9.1 10.2 1.1 15.9 14.9 16.1 1.2 17.9 21.3 79 63
Turkey 5.7 4.9 5.9 1.0 11.0 9.9 11.3 1.4 20.0 30.0 88 80
United Kingdom 22.9 22.4 23.0 0.6 29.7 27.1 30.0 2.9 20.0 30.0 27 19
United States 34.6 32.1 36.0 3.9 35.2 33.7 36.1 2.4 39.1 39.3 6 12
     
Brazil 45.5 45.3 45.6 0.3 42.3 19.8 47.3 27.5 34.0 27.8 3 5
China 24.1 27.1 21.9 5.2 48.3 50.5 46.7 3.8 25.0 25.0 21 2
India 57.1 36.6 62.1 25.5 57.7 47.4 60.3 12.9 34.6 36.6 1 1
Russia 29.0 31.7 28.3 3.4 34.8 37.7 34.2 3.5 20.0 22.0 11 14
 
Argentina 33.9 39.4 32.0 7.4 36.8 50.7 32.0 18.7 35.0 35.0 8 11
Bolivia 24.3 30.7 22.8 7.9 21.4 28.6 19.7 8.9 25.0 25.0 18 42
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Botswana 13.4 8.8 13.9 5.1 14.8 8.8 15.5 6.7 21.4 24.1 61 69
Bulgaria 6.8 6.6 6.9 0.3 7.7 7.9 7.7 0.2 10.0 15.0 86 88
Chad 27.2 31.5 26.3 5.2 39.0 43.0 38.2 4.8 40.0 45.0 14 7
Colombia 16.7 20.0 16.0 4.0 26.5 29.1 26.0 3.1 34.5 35.0 47 26
Costa Rica 26.0 31.1 24.6 6.5 25.0 30.4 23.6 6.8 30.0 30.0 16 29
Croatia 13.2 16.2 12.7 3.5 8.9 11.1 8.4 2.7 30.0 22.0 62 85
Dominican Republic 22.9 25.7 22.2 3.5 22.8 23.8 22.5 1.3 27.0 25.0 28 36
Ecuador 33.8 35.1 33.5 1.6 38.1 39.8 37.8 2.0 12.0 15.0 9 9
Egypt 7.9 17.4 5.0 12.4 10.4 20.8 7.2 13.6 23.1 34.0 85 83
Ethiopia 14.0 27.7 12.7 15.0 14.3 27.6 13.0 14.6 30.0 30.0 56 71
Fiji 13.0 16.2 12.4 3.8 21.6 26.1 20.7 5.4 20.0 31.0 63 40
Georgia 23.2 24.2 22.9 1.3 22.6 24.7 22.2 2.5 15.0 20.0 25 37
Ghana 10.2 14.7 9.6 5.1 10.4 14.8 9.7 5.1 25.0 25.0 76 82
Guyana 34.5 28.3 35.1 6.8 38.0 28.6 39.0 10.4 39.0 39.0 7 10
Hong Kong 0.9 -2.1 1.0 3.1 1.1 -2.1 1.2 3.3 16.5 17.5 92 92
Indonesia 19.7 22.8 18.3 4.5 24.2 27.6 22.5 5.1 25.0 30.0 36 32
Iran 10.1 25.4 6.1 19.3 9.2 22.6 5.7 16.9 28.0 25.0 77 84
Jamaica 28.7 33.0 28.3 4.7 20.3 15.0 20.9 5.9 27.9 33.3 12 46
Jordan 10.1 8.9 10.3 1.4 17.9 12.9 19.0 6.1 19.0 21.7 78 55
Kazakhstan 26.9 29.9 26.4 3.5 29.4 34.0 28.6 5.4 32.0 40.5 15 20
Kenya 15.0 -8.0 19.8 27.8 15.1 -7.7 19.8 27.5 30.0 30.0 54 66
Kuwait 9.8 10.6 9.7 0.9 44.9 50.1 44.1 6.0 17.0 55.0 80 4
Latvia 17.8 16.1 18.0 1.9 6.2 6.9 6.1 0.8 15.0 15.0 41 89
Lesotho 24.1 12.4 27.1 14.7 33.7 18.3 37.5 19.2 22.0 31.0 19 16
Madagascar 12.7 16.5 11.8 4.7 20.5 25.7 19.3 6.4 20.0 30.0 65 45
Malaysia 17.2 19.0 16.3 2.7 19.6 21.5 18.7 2.8 25.0 28.0 44 50
Morocco 13.7 17.8 12.8 5.0 15.9 20.4 15.0 5.4 31.4 35.0 58 62
Nigeria 12.7 20.3 11.8 8.5 12.8 20.3 11.9 8.4 32.0 32.0 66 77
Pakistan 30.3 29.3 30.6 1.3 27.0 29.7 26.4 3.3 33.0 35.0 10 24
Panama 21.3 22.1 21.2 0.9 21.5 22.2 21.4 0.8 25.0 30.0 31 41
Paraguay 13.6 17.1 12.8 4.3 25.0 30.8 23.8 7.0 10.0 30.0 59 30
Peru 21.3 21.7 21.2 0.5 24.2 29.8 22.8 7.0 28.0 30.0 30 31
Philippines 28.0 29.1 27.6 1.5 29.0 31.2 28.2 3.0 30.0 35.0 13 21
Qatar 5.2 7.3 4.9 2.4 21.6 27.5 20.6 6.9 10.0 35.0 90 39
Romania 3.4 4.4 3.0 1.4 3.5 4.5 3.1 1.4 16.0 16.0 91 91
Rwanda 18.8 25.7 18.1 7.6 18.3 25.4 17.7 7.7 30.0 30.0 39 54
Saudi Arabia 19.0 17.7 19.4 1.7 20.3 17.7 20.9 3.2 20.0 20.0 38 47
Serbia 10.6 11.9 10.3 1.6 7.8 8.6 7.6 1.0 15.0 10.0 73 87
Sierra Leone 16.6 11.4 16.9 5.5 20.9 15.3 21.3 6.0 30.0 35.0 48 43
Singapore 9.3 7.0 10.1 3.1 11.2 8.6 12.1 3.5 17.0 20.0 82 79
South Africa 14.2 15.5 13.9 1.6 15.6 17.0 15.3 1.7 28.0 30.0 55 64
Tanzania 20.3 15.8 20.9 5.1 18.9 14.3 19.6 5.3 30.0 30.0 34 52
Thailand 9.8 12.5 8.3 4.2 16.1 20.0 14.1 5.9 20.0 30.0 81 61
Trinidad and 
Tobago 13.4 5.7 17.4 11.7 16.9 7.9 21.4 13.5 25.0 30.0 60 60
Tunisia 16.0 17.4 15.7 1.7 25.7 28.6 25.1 3.5 26.2 35.0 49 27
Uganda 19.6 25.3 18.9 6.4 14.9 10.1 15.5 5.4 30.0 30.0 37 68
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Ukraine 13.8 15.6 13.3 2.3 13.1 16.8 12.1 4.7 18.0 25.0 57 75
Uruguay 23.4 21.2 23.8 2.6 28.5 30.2 28.1 2.1 25.0 30.0 24 22
Uzbekistan 49.0 50.0 48.7 1.3 39.1 41.7 38.3 3.4 14.9 19.0 2 6
Venezuela 17.6 17.5 17.6 0.1 30.2 30.8 30.0 0.8 34.5 34.0 42 18
Vietnam 11.8 17.6 8.8 8.8 15.4 22.6 11.7 10.9 22.0 28.0 70 65
Zambia 8.5 13.2 7.8 5.4 8.7 13.3 8.0 5.3 35.0 35.0 83 86
 
G7* 26.8 25.8 27.4 1.6 35.8 35.0 36.4 1.4 34.6 37.9
G20* 26.5 25.8 26.5 0.7 32.2 31.3 32.2 0.9 32.5 35.2
OECD* 17.7 17.3 17.8 0.5 21.4 21.0 21.5 0.5 25.3 28.2
 
92 Country* 18.6 19.1 18.5 0.6 21.9 22.3 21.7 0.6 25.0 28.6
 
* = Simple average, w=GDP- weighted average.
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TABLE A.4 MARGINAL-EFFECTIVE-TAX-RATE INPUTS
2015 Inflation Tax Depreciation Range Inventory Acounting
Australia 2.6% 2.6% - 22.1% Optional
Austria 2.2% 3.1% - 10.6% Optional
Belgium 2.0% 7.0% - 32.9% LIFO
Canada 2.0% 0.0% - 0.0% 0.0%
Chile 2.8% 7.5% - 39.7% LIFO
Czech Republic 1.7% 3.1% - 20.8% Optional
Denmark 1.8% 5.1% - 22.7% FIFO
Estonia 2.9% 0.0% - 0.0% LIFO
Finland 2.0% 8.2% - 28.7% FIFO
France 1.4% 3.1% - 26.5% Optional
Germany 1.5% 3.1% - 14.4% LIFO
Greece 1.5% 5.3% - 39.2% LIFO
Hungary 3.2% 3.3% - 48.1% Optional
Iceland 4.1% 3.3% - 30.5% FIFO
Ireland 0.8% 2.0% - 12.4% FIFO
Israel 2.0% 4.2% - 29.8% Optional
Italy 1.8% 5.1% - 15.3% LIFO
Japan 0.4% 2.0% - 21.3% Optional
Korea S. 2.4% 2.6% - 20.1% LIFO
Luxembourg 2.1% 4.1% - 21.0% Optional
Mexico 3.9% 5.1% - 15.4% LIFO
Netherlands 1.9% 2.9% - 20.9% Optional
New Zealand 2.0% 6.5% - 22.1% Optional
Norway 1.7% 3.6% - 24.5% FIFO
Poland 2.3% 2.6% - 25.8% LIFO
Portugal 1.6% 2.2% - 19.8% Optional
Slovak Republic 2.0% 5.0% - 17.3% Optional
Slovenia 1.6% 3.5% - 21.6% Optional
Spain 1.7% 2.1% - 29.2% Optional
Sweden 1.0% 3.2% - 19.5% FIFO
Switzerland 0.0% 5.7% - 31.9% LIFO
Turkey 8.1% 12.5% - 48.8% Optional
United Kingdom 2.9% 1.4% - 17.7% FIFO
United States 2.0% 0.0% - 0.0% 0.0%
     
Brazil 5.9% 4.1% - 11.7% Optional
China 3.2% 7.0% - 14.6% Optional
India 9.5% 5.1% - 35.0% Optional
Russia 7.0% 3.1% - 20.8% Optional
       
Argentina 12.6% 4.1% - 11.7% LIFO
Bolivia 5.7% 2.6% - 16.9% FIFO
Botswana 6.7% 2.5% - 24.5% Optional
Bulgaria 1.8% 4.0% - 30.2% Optional
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Chad 2.2% 5.1% - 16.2% Optional
Colombia 2.8% 5.0% - 19.4% LIFO
Costa Rica 5.0% 2.1% - 14.0% LIFO
Croatia 1.7% 5.0% - 29.8% Optional
Dominican Republic 5.3% 6.8% - 17.7% LIFO
Ecuador 3.9% 5.0% - 15.0% LIFO
Egypt 9.6% 5.1% - 26.8% Optional
Ethiopia 16.6% 5.0% - 21.0% Optional
Fiji 3.6% 5.0% - 17.8% FIFO
Georgia 3.5% 7.0% - 21.8% Optional
Ghana 11.2% 10.0% - 29.6% Optional
Guyana 2.3% 2.8% - 35.1% Optional
Hong Kong 4.1% 3.6% - 92.9% Optional
Indonesia 5.5% 5.1% - 14.0% Optional
Iran 23.6% 5.0% - 10.4% Optional
Jamaica 9.0% 3.8% - 12.8% Optional
Jordan 4.5% 4.0% - 23.9% Optional
Kazakhstan 6.6% 10.0% - 26.0% Optional
Kenya 8.1% 2.5% - 28.5% Optional
Kuwait 3.6% 4.2% - 20.4% Optional
Latvia 1.2% 10.0% - 40.8% Optional
Lesotho 5.0% 5.0% - 20.0% FIFO
Madagascar 7.4% 5.0% - 16.5% Optional
Malaysia 2.4% 2.8% - 16.7% FIFO
Morocco 1.1% 7.6% - 33.1% Optional
Nigeria 10.7% 10.0% - 24.8% FIFO
Pakistan 10.1% 10.0% - 25.2% Optional
Panama 4.4% 6.5% - 22.1% LIFO
Paraguay 4.9% 3.3% - 15.9% Optional
Peru 2.9% 4.6% - 20.0% Optional
Philippines 3.7% 6.5% - 22.1% Optional
Qatar 1.5% 5.0% - 19.4% Optional
Romania 4.1% 3.4% - 24.7% LIFO
Rwanda 4.7% 4.1% - 19.7% Optional
Saudi Arabia 4.1% 5.0% - 24.3% Optional
Serbia 6.9% 2.5% - 14.8% Optional
Sierra Leone 12.7% 11.0% - 37.1% Optional
Singapore 3.2% 3.1% - 24.6% FIFO
South Africa 5.3% 5.0% - 25.0% Optional
Tanzania 9.9% 5.0% - 25.3% Optional
Thailand 2.8% 5.0% - 21.0% Optional
Trinidad and Tobago 7.2% 10.0% - 24.9% Optional
Tunisia 4.8% 5.0% - 20.3% Optional
Uganda 9.5% 5.0% - 29.7% Optional
Ukraine 6.1% 8.0% - 37.2% Optional
Uruguay 8.1% 2.8% - 10.0% LIFO
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Uzbekistan 4.5% 5.0% - 18.7% Optional
Venezuela 37.7% 6.5% - 22.1% LIFO
Vietnam 9.6% 3.4% - 25.1% Optional
Zambia 7.3% 5.1% - 47.3% Optional
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TABLE A.5 PROVINCIAL AND OECD METRS BY YEAR (2005 TO 2015)
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2015 Rank (Descending)
Japan 42.1% 44.3% 44.3% 45.8% 45.8% 45.8% 45.8% 45.8% 45.8% 45.8% 45.8% 1
France 36.1% 35.4% 34.8% 34.8% 34.8% 33.7% 34.8% 34.8% 34.8% 33.8% 35.1% 2
United States 34.6% 34.6% 34.6% 34.6% 34.6% 34.6% 34.9% 34.9% 34.9% 35.2% 35.2% 3
Manitoba 28.4% 27.9% 26.2% 26.2% 27.2% 29.8% 31.1% 33.0% 36.3% 40.6% 39.6% 4
British Columbia 27.9% 27.5% 27.5% 17.8% 19.0% 19.9% 29.1% 29.5% 32.2% 35.2% 39.2% 5
Australia 25.7% 25.7% 25.7% 25.7% 25.7% 25.7% 25.7% 25.7% 25.7% 25.7% 25.7% 6
Saskatchewan 24.8% 24.3% 24.3% 24.3% 25.3% 26.0% 26.3% 26.8% 31.4% 38.3% 43.7% 7
Korea S. 24.1% 24.1% 24.1% 24.1% 24.1% 24.1% 24.1% 26.9% 26.9% 26.9% 26.9% 8
Germany 23.8% 24.3% 24.3% 24.3% 24.3% 24.3% 24.3% 24.3% 33.8% 33.8% 33.8% 9
Austria 23.5% 23.5% 23.5% 23.5% 23.5% 23.5% 23.5% 23.5% 23.5% 23.5% 23.5% 10
Norway 23.0% 23.0% 23.9% 23.9% 23.9% 23.9% 23.9% 23.9% 23.9% 23.9% 23.9% 11
United Kingdom 22.9% 23.4% 25.5% 28.4% 26.8% 28.7% 28.6% 28.4% 29.7% 29.7% 29.7% 12
Spain 22.2% 24.0% 24.0% 24.0% 24.0% 24.0% 24.0% 24.0% 26.2% 28.4% 28.4% 13
New Zealand 20.9% 20.9% 20.9% 18.7% 20.9% 17.9% 17.9% 17.9% 20.1% 20.1% 20.1% 14
Portugal 20.9% 22.5% 22.6% 19.1% 20.5% 20.5% 18.6% 18.6% 18.6% 19.3% 19.3% 14
Canada 20.0% 19.0% 18.8% 17.5% 18.8% 19.9% 27.3% 28.0% 30.9% 36.2% 38.8% 16
Alberta 19.3% 17.0% 17.0% 17.0% 18.2% 19.0% 20.0% 20.6% 23.0% 26.6% 31.7% 17
Ontario 18.9% 18.2% 18.2% 18.2% 19.3% 20.3% 32.9% 33.2% 35.1% 40.7% 43.3% 18
Belgium 18.4% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 14.6% 14.6% 22.9% 19
Mexico 17.3% 17.3% 17.4% 16.3% 17.4% 17.4% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.7% 17.4% 20
Netherlands 17.1% 17.1% 17.5% 17.5% 17.5% 17.5% 17.5% 17.5% 17.5% 20.7% 22.2% 21
Quebec 17.1% 15.9% 15.2% 15.2% 17.5% 18.5% 19.9% 21.1% 26.2% 33.7% 36.1% 22
Denmark 17.0% 17.7% 18.2% 18.2% 18.2% 18.2% 18.2% 18.2% 18.2% 20.6% 20.6% 23
Nova Scotia 16.7% 13.4% 6.9% 6.9% 9.6% 11.6% 19.6% 21.0% 24.2% 29.3% 28.1% 24
Slovak Republic 15.6% 15.6% 14.9% 13.4% 13.4% 13.4% 13.4% 13.4% 13.4% 13.4% 13.0% 25
Israel 15.5% 15.5% 14.5% 15.0% 13.8% 14.5% 15.1% 15.8% 17.3% 18.7% 18.7% 26
Sweden 15.2% 15.2% 15.2% 18.5% 18.5% 18.5% 18.5% 19.8% 19.8% 19.8% 19.8% 27
Hungary 15.1% 14.3% 14.3% 14.6% 14.3% 14.3% 14.7% 14.7% 14.7% 14.3% 13.2% 28
Iceland 12.7% 12.7% 12.7% 9.7% 12.7% 11.3% 9.4% 9.4% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 29
Finland 12.6% 12.6% 15.9% 16.7% 17.0% 17.0% 17.0% 17.0% 17.0% 17.0% 17.0% 30
Luxembourg 12.5% 12.0% 12.0% 11.5% 11.7% 11.5% 11.5% 13.3% 14.4% 14.4% 14.9% 31
Czech Republic 12.1% 12.1% 12.1% 12.6% 12.1% 12.1% 12.8% 13.5% 15.7% 15.7% 17.2% 32
Prince Edward 
Island 12.0% 11.2% 11.4% 28.1% 29.2% 29.8% 30.7% 31.2% 33.4% 37.0% 37.5% 33
Poland 11.5% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 34
Newfoundland 11.4% 10.7% 10.7% 10.7% 12.1% 13.1% 14.7% 15.5% 18.4% 22.1% 21.1% 35
Greece 11.3% 14.0% 14.1% 13.4% 11.2% 13.1% 13.6% 13.6% 13.6% 15.6% 17.3% 36
Estonia 10.6% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 12.0% 12.7% 13.4% 37
Ireland 10.4% 10.4% 10.4% 10.4% 10.4% 10.4% 10.4% 10.4% 10.4% 10.4% 10.4% 38
Switzerland 10.0% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.9% 15.9% 15.9% 39
Italy 8.3% 12.9% 21.2% 26.8% 27.2% 27.2% 27.2% 27.3% 32.5% 32.5% 32.5% 40
Chile 6.8% 6.2% 5.9% 5.0% 5.9% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 41
New Brunswick 6.3% 4.8% 3.8% 2.8% 4.3% 6.3% 8.6% 16.9% 21.0% 27.1% 22.3% 42
Turkey 5.7% 5.7% 5.8% 5.8% 5.8% 5.8% 5.8% 5.8% 5.8% 5.8% 11.0% 43
Slovenia 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 6.8% 6.6% 6.6% 7.1% 7.5% 13.3% 14.0% 14.7% 44
40
TABLE A.6 MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES BY INDUSTRY AND PROVINCE, 2015
2015 Agriculture Forestry
Electrical 
Power, Gas 
& Water
Construction Manufacturing Wholesale Trade
Retail 
Trade
Transportation 
and Storage Communications
Other 
services Aggregate
Canada* 18.7% 8.8% 19.5% 25.0% 12.3% 23.3% 23.7% 20.0% 24.1% 25.1% 20.0%
Newfoundland 11.4% -43.7% 0.0% 24.3% -33.6% 21.8% 23.5% 19.4% 22.0% 21.7% 11.4%
Prince Edward 
Island 3.8% -103.6% 0.0% 26.4% -75.3% 25.6% 25.9% 23.2% 23.0% 26.9% 12.0%
Nova Scotia 13.8% -13.9% 21.9% 26.4% -7.4% 25.3% 25.7% 21.1% 23.9% 23.7% 16.7%
New Brunswick 2.7% -33.9% 18.7% 22.8% -25.1% 21.8% 22.2% 17.8% 20.5% 20.3% 6.3%
Quebec 18.2% 4.5% 18.7% 22.7% 8.5% 22.1% 22.4% 17.0% 20.4% 24.6% 17.1%
Ontario 17.8% 12.9% 18.2% 22.3% 14.6% 21.3% 21.8% 17.5% 20.0% 23.3% 18.9%
Manitoba 24.4% 6.3% 24.8% 36.8% 6.7% 31.1% 30.8% 28.6% 40.3% 37.3% 28.4%
Saskatchewan 22.2% 13.1% 22.8% 32.1% 15.0% 29.0% 28.2% 23.5% 35.4% 31.1% 24.8%
Alberta 18.1% 14.7% 18.7% 22.8% 17.6% 21.8% 22.2% 18.1% 20.5% 20.3% 19.3%
British  
Columbia 23.4% 17.9% 23.5% 34.6% 20.2% 29.4% 29.1% 24.4% 37.5% 33.1% 27.9%
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